Open Letter to GAO, DOD, Veterans Affairs and Congress

May 2004
CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE
DOD Needs to
Continue to Collect
and Provide
Information on Tests
and on Potentially
Exposed Personnel

To Whom It May Concern, Who do I need to speak with concerning NAS/IOM reports that DOD and the VA use to justify either compensating or not compensating veterans or their widows. I am one of the enlisted men from the human experiments at Edgewood Arsenal in 1974. The Cold War Experiments ran from 1955 thru 1975.

I am also in contact with Jack Alderson, Commander, US Navy, Retired that is a member of the Operation SHAD/112 group and he has many of the same concerns as I have, that we are not getting a fair shake from the Department of Defense and less than complete health studies from the IOM MUFA unit, and DR William Page seems to be at the center of all of the MUFA studies that DOD used to decide compensation criteria for all of the veterans from the different programs, most were incomplete studies or some groups were never studied for long term health effects.

Bottom line, is the veterans have been ill served over the past 33 years since the final classified human experiments were stopped my President Ford in 1975, 33 years ago, many of the veteran are disabled or dead, at rates higher than normal for men our age. Which considering we were the healthiest young men the scientists had to choose from at the time, does not make sense, unless exposures, either deliberate or environmental exposure, or both could have played a part.

This recent manual from the NAS makes it plain that the veterans will never know the truth about the exposures http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11908

Authors:
Committee on Evaluation of the Presumptive Disability Decision-Making Process for Veterans, Jonathan M. Samet and Catherine C. Bodurow, Editors
Authoring Organizations

http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11908&page=298

LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION
Policies governing DoD’s classification program are implemented through the Information Security Program (DoD, 1997). This regulation implements Executive Order 12958 (Clinton, 1995), “Classified National Security Information,” and has been codified at 32 CFR Part 159 (DoD Information Security Program. 2001. 32 C.F.R. § 159). “A security clearance is a determination that a person is eligible for access to classified information. ‘Need to know’ is a determination made by a possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, or knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to accomplish lawful and authorized government purposes” (Pike, 2002). Current levels of classification are broadly contained under the headings of Unclassified, Limited, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, Limited Dissemination (LIMDIS), Special Access Program (SAP), and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) (Pike, 2002). Appendix L-2 provides a discussion of each of the categories of unclassified and classified information control.

No person may have access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized government purposes, that is, the person has the appropriate security clearance and a need to know. Further, cleared personnel may not have access until they have been given an initial security briefing. Procedures are established by the head of each DoD component to prevent unnecessary access to classified information. (Pike, 2002)



There must be a demonstrable need for access to classified information before a request for a personnel security clearance can be initiated. The number of people cleared and granted access to classified information is maintained at the minimum number that is consistent with operational requirements and needs. No one has a right to have access to classified information solely by virtue of rank or position. The final responsibility for determining whether an individual’s official duties require possession of or access to any element or item of classified information, and whether the individual has been granted the appropriate security clearance by proper authority, rests upon the individual who has authorized possession, knowledge, or control of the information and not upon the prospective recipient. (Pike, 2002)

SECRECY AND MEDICAL RESEARCH
Numerous aspects of medical research have been classified on the basis of national security and have only recently been brought to public light. The

ACHRE Report (ACHRE, 1995) enumerated numerous radiation studies conducted during and after World War II which were classified, and some still have not been declassified. Although the Espionage Act of 1918 really began the era of national security classification, more and more documents have been classified with each new Presidential administration (ACHRE, 1995; Quist, 2002). Today the system is complicated and burdensome to use as discussed above. Medical research is still conducted and classified under the aegis of national security. This secrecy classification can establish hindrances in the medical care provided to the participants in these studies. All institutions that participate in medical research have some degree of classification for their projects, depending upon funding sponsor, subject, and agents used. Much of the current research on modern nerve agents, for example, is classified at the secret and above levels, even though there are many unclassified documents on nerve agents available to the public (IOM, 1993). And while DoD participates extensively in classified medical research studies, VA has not been excluded from such activities. Chapter 13 of the ACHRE Report outlined VA participation in maintenance of “confidential” files regarding radiation studies:

VA, similarly, was able to provide fragments of information that show that “confidential” files were kept in anticipation of potential radiation liability claims. However, neither the VA, nor the DOE and DoD (who evidently were parties to this secret record keeping), have been able to determine exactly what secret records were kept and what rules governed their collection and availability. (ACHRE, 1995, ch. 13)

(As explained in Chapter 10 of the ACHRE Report, VA concluded that a “confidential” division contemplated in relation to secret record keeping was not activated.)

VA publications did contain lists of several thousand (nonclassified) human experiments conducted at VA facilities; however, the information was quite fragmentary, and further information could not be readily retrieved (if it still exists) on the vast majority of these experiments. Thus, in looking for answers to questions about the secrecy of data on human experiments and intentional releases, we find record-keeping practices that leave questions about both what secrets were kept and what rules governed the keeping of secrets. (ACHRE, 1995, ch. 13)

Medical research involving human subjects must follow certain ethical and standard practice guidelines such as those established by the Nuremberg Code of 1947 (Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 1949). The 10 key elements of the Nuremberg Code are outlined in Appendix L-3.

Some medical research studies conducted prior to the Nuremburg Code implementation might not have followed the precepts of the code. Congressional inquiries during 1975 and 1976 requested that the Army Inspector General review the use of human volunteers in chemical agent research (IOM, 1993). An excerpted summary of this review (Taylor and Johnson, 1975) is presented in Appendix L-4. While this report concentrated on psychochemical testing conducted during the period 1950-1975, it also addressed the history of chemical warfare testing using human volunteers and the degree of compliance with the Nuremberg Code (IOM, 1993). The overriding conclusion from this report was that the secrecy applied to research using human volunteers “left ample room for misinterpretation, lack of knowledge about [guidelines governing human volunteers] and outright disregard for established policies and guidelines” (Taylor and Johnson, 1975, as referenced in IOM, 1993, p. 379). Concern regarding these conclusions remains today.

The issue of secrecy hindering medical treatment for veterans is amply exhibited in the IOM report Veterans at Risk: The Health Effects of Mustard Gas and Lewisite (IOM, 1993). Serious concerns were enumerated in the report over the secrecy issue demonstrated by DoD



This shows to some extent that the veterans have never been given any type of full access to data regarding the full extent of the experiments, all of the substances, how much of each substance were we exposed to, at what level does damage begin, did the scientists even know?

What effect did the toxins in the drinking water, surface water and soil of the training areas have on the men assigned to Edgewood Arsenal for the experiments, how much of the water was safe to drink, how much of the water did each veteran have to consume before long term health effects were started?

http://cfpub1.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/ccontinfo.cfm?id=0300421 EPA Superfund site data for EA

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND (EDGEWOOD AREA)
Contaminants

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The below list only includes contaminants identified as contaminants of concern (COCs) for this site. COCs are the site-specific chemical substances that the health assessor selects for further evaluation of potential health effects. Identifying contaminants of concern is a process that requires the assessor to examine contaminant concentrations at the site, the quality of environmental sampling data and the potential for human exposure.

Media Contaminant Contaminant Group
Groundwater 1,1,1,2-TETRACHLOROETHANE VOC
Soil 1,1,2,2-TETRABROMOETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1,2,2-TETRACHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1,2-TRICHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,1-DICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater 1,2,4-TRICHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater 1,2-DICHLOROBENZENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,2-DICHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,2-TRANS-DICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater 1,4-DICHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Soil 2-HEXANONE VOC
Sediment 2-METHYLNAPHTHALENE PAH
Sediment 4,4-DDE Pesticides
Sediment, Soil 4,4-DDT Pesticides
Groundwater ACETONE VOC
Groundwater ALUMINUM (FUME OR DUST) Metals
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water ANTIMONY Metals
Soil AROCLOR 1248 PCBs
Soil AROCLOR 1254 PCBs
Soil AROCLOR 1260 PCBs
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water ARSENIC Metals
Groundwater, Soil BARIUM Metals
Groundwater BENZENE VOC
Soil BENZO(B)FLUORANTHENE PAH
Groundwater BENZOIC ACID Base Neutral Acids
Soil BENZO[A]ANTHRACENE PAH
Sediment, Soil BENZO[A]PYRENE PAH
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil BERYLLIUM Metals
Groundwater BORON OXIDE Inorganics
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water CADMIUM Metals
Groundwater CALCIUM Metals
Soil CALCIUM CARBONATE Inorganics
Groundwater CARBON DISULFIDE VOC
Groundwater CARBON TETRACHLORIDE VOC
Sediment CHLORDANE Pesticides
Groundwater CHLOROBENZENE VOC
Groundwater CHLOROFORM VOC
Groundwater, Soil CHROMIUM Metals
Groundwater CIS-1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater COBALT AND COMPOUNDS Inorganics
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water COPPER Metals
Groundwater CYANIDE Inorganics
Soil DIBENZO(A,H)ANTHRACENE PAH
Groundwater ETHYLBENZENE VOC
Soil HEPTACHLOR Pesticides
Soil HEPTACHLOR EPOXIDE Pesticides
Soil HEXACHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater HEXACHLOROBUTADIENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater, Soil HEXACHLOROETHANE VOC
Soil INDENO(1,2,3-CD)PYRENE PAH
Solid Waste INORGANICS Inorganics
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water IRON Metals
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water LEAD Metals
Soil LEWISITE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater, Sediment MAGNESIUM Metals
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water MANGANESE Metals
Groundwater, Soil MERCURY Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water METHYLENE CHLORIDE VOC
Soil MUSTARD GAS Organics
Groundwater NICKEL Metals
Groundwater NITRATE Inorganics
Solid Waste NOT PROVIDED Not Provided
Soil OIL & GREASE Oil & Grease
Soil, Solid Waste PCBs PCBs
Sediment PHENANTHRENE PAH
Soil PHOSGENE Pesticides
Soil PHOSPHORUS (YELLOW OR WHITE) Inorganics
Groundwater POTASSIUM Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water SELENIUM Metals
Groundwater, Soil SILVER Metals
Groundwater SODIUM Metals
Groundwater TETRACHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater TETRACHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater, Soil THALLIUM Metals
Groundwater TOLUENE VOC
Groundwater TRANS-1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater TRICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water TRICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater VANADIUM (FUME OR DUST) Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water VINYL CHLORIDE VOC
Solid Waste VOC VOC
Groundwater XYLENES VOC
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water ZINC Metals


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These toxins cause medical problems in every body system there is. Yet the VA refuses to acknowledge we may have been harmed by the exposures, why?



http://www.ehponline.org/members/1994/102-1/munro-full.html Jan 1, 1994 National Institute of Health Report on damage caused by exposure to Sarin and GB this report shows cardiovascular problems related to low level exposures of Sarin yet DR Page ignored it when he wrote his March 2003 IOM Sarin Report based on the Edgewood Arsenal veterans being used as the control group for the veterans exposed at Kamisayah Iraq in March 1991, they also neglected to take into account teh fact that mustard agents were also present in the ammo bunkers at Kamisyah.



If you do not take all substances into account, you get flawed results, it is my understanding that DR Page was working to parameters set by DOD, if this is true, why were the parameters set improperly? Should any of the veterans that were in the control group, also have been in the Middle East where they could have come in contact with the substances during GW1. I don't think DR Page took this into account due to the dates of the experiments and GW1, but some of us were in the national Guard and were activated for GW1.

To me the worst evidence is this work by DR Karl Heinz Lohs based on 30 years of research on Wermacht soldiers from WW2 Germany who worked on their chemical weapons program. DR Lohs treated these men from the end of WW2 until 1974 when this report was written and published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) http://www.sipri.org/contents/cbwarfare/Publications/pdfs/cw-delayed.pdf

Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents

page 40

To conclude this section, the closing observations from Spiegelberg’s monograph
will be cited (these remarks do not refer exclusively to organophosphorus
CW agents) [2]:
A psychiatric delayed-effect syndrome was found as a result of systematic investigations
on former members of CW production and testing stations for the Wehrmacht. In
terms of frequency, two groups of symptoms can be distinguished–each consisting of
four separate symptoms or signs.
(1) The great majority of persons examined showed:
(a) persistently lowered vitality accompanied by marked diminution in drive;
(b) defective autonomic regulation leading to cephalalgia, gastrointestinal and
cardiovascular symptoms, and premature decline in libido and potency;
(c) intolerance symptoms (alcohol, nicotine, medicines);
(d) impression of premature aging.
(2) Further, one or more symptoms of the second group were found:
(a) depressive or subdepressive disorders of vital functions;
(b) cerebral vegetative (syncopal) attacks;
(c) slight or moderate amnestic and demential defects;
(d) slight organoneurological defects (predominantly microsymptoms and singular
signs of extrapyramidal character).
Our results are a contribution to the general question of psychopathological delayed
and permanent lesions caused by industrial poisoning. On the basis of our studies of
the etiologically different manifestations of toxication, the possibility of a relatively
uniform–though equally unspecific–cerebro-organic delayed effect syndrome is conceivable

Many of the men from the Edgewood experiments do suffer from these medical problems, as you can see from this enclosed attachment from the group

We have contact information on 24 former Edgewood Volunteers, five of whom are also Vietnam War Veterans. Of these: 8 are contact information only, 8 partially filled out a questionnaire, and 8 filled it out fully. The information herein therefore, comes from 16 men.

It must be made clear that Edgewood Volunteers we were not part of Whitecoat, Project 112, SHAD or Radiological experiments. However, the latter three are listed in VA “mandatory care” categories and Edgewood Veterans are not. The U.S Army Medical Research and Material Command informed us in 2007 that there were 7,839 Volunteers between 1951 to 1979. We were part of the formal experimentation years at Edgewood 1955-1975.

In 2003 the IOM stated that in 2000 they had contacted 4,022 Edgewood survivors. It is safe to suggest that there are less than 4,000 of us surviving today. The nagging question is; how many died of causes related to experimentation and how many living are disabled as a result of their Edgewood service? Col/Dr. James Ketchum wrote a book about Edgewood wherein he stated that there were no significant injuries amongst the volunteers and the DOD 2006 letter to Edgewood Veterans in stark contrast to the 1994 GAO report by stating that there were no significant long term effects.

The breakdown of Volunteer numbers of those known to us and the years they served at Edgewood are as follows: 1958: 313, 382, 781. [This is a sequential oddity because all served in the same month]

1965: 3738.

1966: 4088, 4095.

1968: 5247.

1969: 5619.

1970: 5984.

1972: 6145, 6566.

1973: 6640, 6692. [This is another sequential oddity, see 1969]

1974: 6778

The 16 answered as follows:

Military Records received: 6

Military Medical records received: 5

Medical Care promises received at Edgewood: 7

Edgewood Files received: 12

Volunteer Handbook received: 1 [1968 edition, none of the others ever saw one]

Signed Participation Agreement: 12

Signed Security Non-Disclosures: 5 [others received warnings and/or threats regarding disclosure]

Aware of Psychochemicals Projects before volunteering -0-

Aware of CIA participation at Edgewood: -0-

Medals promises received at Edgewood: 7

Received a letter of commendation: 11

Received a certificate of outstanding performance: 7

Contacted for the 1980 Army LSD study: 2

Contacted by the NAS for the 1980’s NRC studies: 7

Contacted by IOM for the 2000’s NAS study: 5

Contacted by the VA for its 2006 outreach: 11

Received the DoD enclosure in VA letter: 5

Listed on the DOD Edgewood registry: 4

Awarded Social Security Disability: 6

Awarded VA disability compensation: 1 @ 60%, 1 @ 80%, 6 @ 100%.

We see that 8 of sixteen men have Service Connected Disabilities, six of them Total and Permanent, and six of 16 are also Totally Disabled for Social Security purposes.

Seven of the 16 men reported partial or more PTSD disability compensation. The following may help us better understand this statistic.

1985 NAS/NRC long-term studies on volunteers Appendix C: [That the Army did not supply the names of all those exposed to drugs is evident]: “An issue of great concern was the relatively small group of men exposed to psychochemicals and their effects on interpretability. Briefly stated, it was felt at the outset by the panel reviewing psychochemicals that data obtainable from a survey might add little to our understanding of the long-term health effects of chemicals tested.”

The VA 2006 pg. 23, “Potential Health Effects Among Veterans Involved in Military Chemical Warfare Agent Experiments …” “Some of these exposures had the potential to cause substantial harm to the veterans health …” “ … long-term psychological effects could have resulted from just participating in these experiments.” DOD 2006 Fact Sheet: “Although the current medical literature indicates that such exposure may have some long lasting effects among some individuals, such as flashbacks [visual hallucinations] without new drug exposures.”

Finally, the 2007 Annals of Psychiatry state: “Interestingly, PTSD rates among veterans who participated in voluntary Chemical Warfare Agent research under controlled conditions, and were never expsoed to hostile enemy fire, were found to be higher than PTSD rates for veterans who participated in actual combat, in which the physical wounds inflicted were far more severe” “… the psychological trauma of Chemical Warfare Agents exposure is tantamount to the most intense and traumatizing types of stress found anywhere in human experience.”

We can now better understand why 8 men have Service Connected disabilities that include 7 with PTSD and their overall disabilities led to total Social Security disabilty for 6 of them.

To save the Army the cost of hazard pay they set the stage in 1958. The Chemical Warfare Laboratories published SP 2-13 wherein they stated that: “ … your participation in the various testing programs will be profitable to you and the U.S. Army” “… experimental procedures involving NON-hazardous exposure to compounds …” “ … volunteers are not allowed hazardous duty pay.” It is odd that they stated there were no hazards becausel, The volunteer’s participation agreements stated “I am completely aware of all hazards.” Additionaly, letters of commendation to Edgewood volunteers stated: ”… you deliberately made a commitment to undergo procedures whose outcome could not be fully known in advance” “….you not only displayed courage and maturity … .” The Army knew there were cosiderable hazards when they published AR 70-25 in 1962: “Volunteers as Subjects of Research”. “The experiment must be such as to contribute significantly to approved research …” “… unusual and potentially hazardous conditions are those that may be reasonably expected to involve risk, beyond the normal call of duty, of privation, discomfort, distress, pain, damage to health, bodily harm, physical injury, or death.” By 1975 all the latter had come to pass therfore, we could almost consider this AR to be an after action report.

The DoD certainly knew there were hazards. Defense Instruction 5030.29 1964: “DOD assumes full responsibility for humans involved in research under its sponsorship, whether this involves investigational drugs or other hazards.” In light of the Feres Doctrine their assumption of responsibility was meaningless and only intended to conform with the Helsinki Accords. “Edgewood Arsenal personnel knew well that experimentation was hazardous. In 1961 they published CDRL 2-44 wherein they lauded volunteers as ”Peacetime Heroes” “ … they serve far beyond the call of normal peacetime duty in a cause that vitally affects the nation’s defense posture.” They subjected themselves to risk in hazardous service and is reflected in the words on their commedndations: “above and beyond the call of duty.”

LTC Elfert served at Edgewood in 1958 and he suggested that the volunteers service was similarily stressful to combat. The DOD currently has a program entitled Combat Related Special Compensation for its Military retirees which is not limited to direct combat. Qualifiers include: While engaged in hazardous service, such as an experimental stress study [psychochemicals intended to cause maximum stress] and Instrumentality of War: Injury or sickness caused by gasses [mustard which is a carcinogen, CN a cyanide which causes heart damage, and DM an arsenic, all of which were tested at Edgewood along with 250 other chemicals].

The U.S. Army HRC Awards Branch in 2005 admitted to CIA MKULTRA participation at Edgewood when they answeried a volunteers query: “ … testing in the Edgewood Arsenal MKULTRA Program.” CIA MORI Documents clearly prove that the CIA funded Army experiments for over twenty years and that MKULTRA sub-project-45 in psychochemicals and K fields, known simply as the K agent program at Edgewood, was conducted using manufacturers reject drugs known to have bad side effects, and those were supplied by the CIA to Edgewood specifically for testing on Armed Forces volunteers.

That the Army and the DOD did not want to know about health cause and effect relationships, as they pertained to Edgewood volunteers, was made obvious by their actions and inactions.

In 1970-1971 the Army conducted a long term Follow-up Study of Medical Volunteers who received drugs at Edgewood. II Method. “It was decided to limit the study to volunteers who were serving on active duty. The study was limited to 40 men and conducted over a ten month period. “No subject felt that he had experienced physical or psychological changes as a result of participation in the program.” The army was likely pleased to know that its career soldiers suffered no ill effects. This gives rise to the question of what would have happened to the career soldier who admitted having residual mental issues?

The 1985 National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council final report pg. 50: “It appears that the subjects actually given psychochemicals in those experiments were selected from an optimal pool of mentally and physically healthy persons.” The 2006 DoD Fact sheet: “As a group, the volunteers selected to participate in the studies were above average in physical and mental qualifications when compared to other service personnel.” The DOD Fact Sheet sent to Volunteers informs them that the NAS/NRC stated: “The study did not detect any significant long-term health effects in Edgewood Arsenal Volunteers.” The NAS/NRC study final report actually stated: “However, the limited information available from follow-up on these soldiers does not permit definitive conclusions regarding the nature and extent of possible long-term problems resulting from chemical exposure at Edgewood.”

The 1975 Army Inspector General report stated Edgewood informed them that as of 1966 there were no volunteer deaths. The 1994 Government Accountability Office Report stated that there were some deaths and that “adverse health problems were not discovered until many years later --- often 20-30 years and longer.” VA Veterans Health Initiative 2003: “… ultimatley to compensation for a few families of subjects who had died during the experiments.” 1993 DOD {Human Experimentation}: “ … the DOD will, to the extent feasible, make available to the Department of Veterans Affairs information that may be useful in assessing disability claims of veterans. Edgewood veterans arriving at the doors of a VA prior to 2006 received little more than a denial of such a programs existence [Edgewood human volunteer experiments]. The NAS Institute of Medicine [IOM] conducted a study for the DOD beginning in 2000. In 2007 the Director wrote: The IOM committee was not charged with examining past exposures to specific chemicals, like those at Aberdeen/Edgewood, and assessing whether they caused disabilities in military personnel” “… where veterans were exposed to agents in classified experiments, the veterans were at a disadvantage, because it was difficult to get access to secret information needed to adjudicate their claims

Seven men remembered being promised medals at Edgewood. If the reader sees things as the DOD and the Army, then the rational for denying an Edgewood veteran medals earned the hard way is obvious because a medal for an Edgewood volunteer a road to culpability and an admission that their service was hazardous, that they were brave, courageous, and some valorious in their perilous Edgewood journey. Psychiatrists agree that it is rare for two individuals to have the same reactions to drugs and stressors or for them to have the same degree of suffering. Few had exactly the same agents and doses at the same time therefore, they were all set apart from their fellows making them eligible for individual awards.

U.S. Army HRC Awards Branch 2005: “ … volunteer service at the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Center, Edgewood, MD, is noteworthy, but he is not eligible for consideration of an individual award since the purpose and intent of the Army’s Awards Program is to recognize soldiers who actively engage in acts of heroism, meritorious achievement or meritorious service. Accordingly, these four recommendations cannot be considerd for review by the Army Decorations Board.

The DOD has stated that there were no significant long term effects leaving us to ponder the word significant, because the self evident truths herein can only lead a prudent man to conclude that the DOD and the Army cannot defend against, what they term allegations, because the issues of injuries that led to disabilities of half a sample presented herein are not reasonably debatable. Edgewood service was hazardous which caused death and injuries. A grateful nation needs to recognize these facts and properly reward those who gave of themselves in the name of National Security.

, kbeaudoin@mofo.com, webco99@hotmail.com, gene@capoferri.com, pfcarone@optonline.net, ddufrane@nycap.rr.com, jearnshaw@neo.rr.com, gerspamer@mofo.com, milton.farris@gmail.com, FaronYoung2@netscape.com, dongedeon@aol.com, pines489@yahoo.com, hytien@msn.com, pateacher@hotmail.com, allus231@msn.com, firehawk_28@yahoo.com, rmauro7846@yahoo.com, vbmay06@westriv.com, lamei2006@aol.com, roy@workplans.com, majordave84@yahoo.com, may551@hotmail.com, jratkinson@hotmail.com, purdiemae@yahoo.com, fmokar@embarqmail.com, tomsegel@sbcglobal.net


emuth@sbcglobal.net

The names above are among the people interested in the Edgewood veterans, spouses, veterans and advocates.

Some of these men have been waiting since the late 50s when they were used in the experiments, they felt they were going to finally get the promised medals/awards they were promised more than 50 years ago, the medical care and in the case of disabled veterans and widows, when the DOD and VA started contacting the veterans about the experiments in 2006,compensation and DIC payments, instead, we get put on the VARO hamster wheel where we are told our evidence is "internet garbage", incomplete and very narrow scoped medical follow up reports by the IOM due to parameters written by the DOD.

The veterans of the Cold war experiments, Edgewood Arsenal, SHAD/112, Fort Detricks Operation White Coat, Dugway Proving Grounds, Deseret cCenter Utah, chemical weapons experiments at the Cold Weather training Area Fort Greely Alaska, and any other unknown or admitted areas of experiments on human test subjects.

Many of us accept the fact that we will never know all of the susbtances we may have been exposed to, due to double blind experiments, I am not sure even the scientists know at this point, who was given what, nor when other than the window of the temporary duty assignment.

Myself I was there from June 25 1974 thru 22 August 1974 and my number is 6778A or 6778C depending on which paperwork the Army decides to locate, I have seen both.

Is there anything the GAO can do to help these veterans and their widows and families, since DOD, the VA and the IOM and NAS seem to be having problems helping us.

Michael G Bailey

1113 Swannanoa Drive

West Columbia, SC 29170

803-739-5749



CC Rick Erdtman NAS

J Nelligan GAO

Scott.Payne@mail.house.gov Congressman John Halls Office

sharon.schultze@mail.house.gov Congressman Filner's Office

Jack Alderson, Commander, US Navy Retired Operation SHAD/112

other SHAD and Edgewood veterans

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