McCain's Miserable Record of Not Supporting America's Troops and Veterans --

McCain's Miserable Record of Not Supporting America's Troops and Veterans --

by: Brandon Friedman
Wed Oct 01, 2008 at 11:13:26 AM EDT



On Friday, September September 26, 2008, John McCain said the following:

"I know the veterans, I know them well, and I know that they know that I'll take care of them, and I have been proud of their support and their recognition of my service to the veterans, and I love them, and I'll take care of them, and they know that I'll take care of them."
This statement--made near the end of Friday's debate--immediately infuriated veterans across America and overseas. In fact, Senator John McCain has a very clear, long, and illustrious history of not supporting troops and veterans one bit.

Now, I've seen legislative examples, I've watched the YouTubes, and I've lived this lack of support in more ways than one. But now, for the first time, I've tried to compile as much of this non-support as possible into a single document--from a variety of sources--complete with links, quotes, and video clips. It's something that readers often ask me about, so I hope this helps. I'm sure there's a lot missing, so feel free to add more in the comments. But for now, I think this should give us a good start in exposing John McCain's abysmal of record of supporting troops and veterans. Here we go:




Senator John McCain's Record on Troop and Veterans' Issues




Voting Against Veterans

Veterans Groups Give McCain Failing Grades. In its most recent legislative ratings, the non-partisan Disabled American Veterans gave Sen. McCain a 20 percent rating for his voting record on veterans' issues. Similarly, the non-partisan Iraq & Afghanistan Veterans of America gave McCain a "D" grade for his poor voting record on veterans' issues, including McCain's votes against additional body armor for troops in combat and additional funding for PTSD and TBI screening and treatment.

McCain Voted Against Increased Funding for Veterans' Health Care. Although McCain told voters at a campaign rally that improving veterans' health care was his top domestic priority, he voted against increasing funding for veterans' health care in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. (Greenville News, 12/12/2007; S.Amdt. 2745 to S.C.R. 95, Vote 40, 3/10/04; Senate S.C.R. 18, Vote 55, 3/16/05; S.Amdt. 3007 to S.C.R. 83, Vote 41, 3/14/06; H.R. 1591, Vote 126, 3/29/07)

McCain Voted At Least 28 Times Against Veterans' Benefits, Including Healthcare. Since arriving in the U.S. Senate in 1987, McCain has voted at least 28 times against ensuring important benefits for America's veterans, including providing adequate healthcare. (2006 Senate Vote #7, 41, 63, 67, 98, 222; 2005 Senate Votes #55, 89, 90, 251, 343; 2004 Senate Votes #40, 48, 145; 2003 Senate Votes #74, 81, 83; 1999 Senate Vote #328; 1998 Senate Vote #175; 1997 Senate Vote #168; 1996 Senate Votes #115, 275; 1995 Senate Votes #76, 226, 466; 1994 Senate Vote #306; 1992 Senate Vote #194; 1991 Senate Vote #259)

McCain Voted Against Providing Automatic Cost-of-Living Adjustments to Veterans. McCain voted against providing automatic annual cost-of-living adjustments for certain veterans' benefits. (S. 869, Vote 259, 11/20/91)

McCain Voted to Underfund Department of Veterans Affairs. McCain voted for an appropriations bill that underfunded the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development by $8.9 billion. (H.R. 2099, Vote 470, 9/27/95)

McCain Voted Against a $13 Billion Increase in Funding for Veterans Programs. McCain voted against an amendment to increase spending on veterans programs by $13 billion. (S.C.R. 57, Vote 115, 5/16/96)

McCain Voted Against $44.3 Billion for Veterans Programs. McCain was one of five senators to vote against a bill providing $44.3 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs, plus funding for other federal agencies. (H.R. 2684, Vote 328, 10/15/99)

McCain Voted Against $47 Billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs. McCain was one of eight senators to vote against a bill that provided $47 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs. (H.R. 4635, Vote 272, 10/12/00)

McCain Voted Against $51 Billion in Veterans Funding. McCain was one of five senators to vote against the bill and seven to vote against the conference report that provided $51.1 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs, as well as funding for the federal housing, environmental and emergency management agencies and NASA. (H.R. 2620, Vote 334, 11/8/01; Vote 269, 8/2/01)

McCain Voted Against $122.7 Billion for Department of Veterans Affairs. McCain voted against an appropriations bill that included $122.7 billion in fiscal 2004 for the Department of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development and other related agencies. (H.R. 2861, Vote 449, 11/12/03)

McCain Opposed $500 Million for Counseling Services for Veterans with Mental Disorders. McCain voted against an amendment to appropriate $500 million annually from 2006-2010 for counseling, mental health and rehabilitation services for veterans diagnosed with mental illness, posttraumatic stress disorder or substance abuse. (S. 2020, S.Amdt. 2634, Vote 343, 11/17/05)

McCain opposed an Assured Funding Stream for Veterans' Health Care. McCain opposed providing an assured funding stream for veterans' health care, taking into account annual changes in veterans' population and inflation. (S.Amdt. 3141 to S.C.R. 83, Vote 63, 3/16/06)

McCain Voted Against Adding More Than $400 Million for Veterans' Care. McCain was one of 13 Republicans to vote against providing an additional $430 million to the Department of Veterans Affairs for outpatient care and treatment for veterans. (S.Amdt. 3642 to H.R. 4939, Vote 98, 4/26/06)

McCain Supported Outsourcing VA Jobs. McCain opposed an amendment that would have prevented the Department of Veterans Affairs from outsourcing jobs, many held by blue-collar veterans, without first giving the workers a chance to compete. (S.Amdt. 2673 to H.R. 2642, Vote 315, 9/6/07)

McCain Opposed the 21st Century GI Bill Because It Was Too Generous. McCain did not vote on the GI Bill that will provide better educational opportunities to veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, paying full tuition at in-state schools and living expenses for those who have served at least three years since the 9/11 attacks. McCain said he opposes the bill because he thinks the generous benefits would "encourage more people to leave the military." (S.Amdt. 4803 to H.R. 2642, Vote 137, 5/22/08; Chattanooga Times Free Press, 6/2/08; Boston Globe, 5/23/08; ABCNews.com, 5/26/08)

Disabled American Veterans Legislative Director Said That McCain's Proposal Would Increase Costs For Veterans Because His Plan Relies On Private Hospitals Which Are More Expensive and Which Could Also Lead To Further Rationing Of Care. "To help veterans who live far from VA hospitals or need specialized care the VA can't provide, McCain proposed giving low-income veterans and those who incurred injury during their service a card they could use at private hospitals. The proposal is not an attempt to privatize the VA, as critics have alleged, but rather, an effort to improve care and access to it, he said. Joe Violanti, legislative director of the Disabled American Veterans, a nonpartisan organization, said the proposal would increase costs because private hospitals are more expensive. The increased cost could lead to further rationing of care, he said." (Las Vegas Sun, 8/10/08)

Lack of Support for the Troops

McCain co-sponsored the Use of Force Authorization. McCain supported the bill that gave President George W. Bush the green light--and a blank check--for going to war with Iraq. (SJ Res 46, 10/3/02)

McCain Opposed Increasing Spending on TRICARE and Giving Greater Access to National Guard and Reservists. Although his campaign website devotes a large section to veterans issues, including expanding benefits for reservists and members of the National Guard, McCain voted against increasing spending on the TRICARE program by $20.3 billion over 10 years to give members of the National Guard and Reserves and their families greater access to the health care program. The increase would be offset by a reduction in tax cuts for the wealthy. (S.Amdt. 324 to S.C.R. 23, Vote 81, 3/25/03)

McCain voted against holding Bush accountable for his actions in the war. McCain opposed the creation of an independent commission to investigate the development and use of intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq. (S.Amdt. 1275 to H.R. 2658, Vote 284, 7/16/03)

McCain voted Against Establishing a $1 Billion Trust Fund for Military Health Facilities. McCain voted against establishing a $1 billion trust fund to improve military health facilities by refusing to repeal tax cuts for those making more than $1 million a year. (S.Amdt. 2735 to S.Amdt. 2707 to H.R. 4297, Vote 7, 2/2/06)

Senator McCain opposed efforts to end the overextension of the military--a policy that is having a devastating impact on our troops. McCain voted against requiring mandatory minimum downtime between tours of duty for troops serving in Iraq. (S.Amdt.. 2909 to S.Amdt. 2011 to HR 1585, Vote 341, 9/19/07; S.Amdt. 2012 to S.Amdt. 2011 to HR 1585, Vote 241, 7/11/07)

McCain announced his willingness to keep U.S. troops in Iraq for decades--a statement sure to inflame Iraqis and endanger American troops. McCain: "Make it a hundred" years in Iraq and "that would be fine with me." (Derry, New Hampshire Town Hall meeting, 1/3/08)



McCain voted against a ban on waterboarding--a form of torture--in a move that could eventually endanger American troops. According to ThinkProgress, "the Senate brought the Intelligence Authorization Bill to the floor, which contained a provision from Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) establishing one interrogation standard across the government. The bill requires the intelligence community to abide by the same standards as articulated in the Army Field Manual and bans waterboarding." McCain voted against the bill. (H.R. 2082, Vote 22, 2/13/08)

McCain Also Supported Outsourcing at Walter Reed. McCain opposed an amendment to prevent the outsourcing of 350 federal employee jobs at Walter Reed Army Medical Center--outsourcing that contributed to the scandalous treatment of veterans at Walter Reed that McCain called a "disgrace." (S.Amdt. 4895 to H.R. 5631, Vote 234, 9/6/06; Speech to VFW in Kansas City, Mo., 4/4/08)

Senator McCain has consistently opposed any plan to withdraw troops from Iraq--a policy that has directly weakened American efforts in Afghanistan. Senator McCain repeatedly voted against a timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq. (S.Amdt. 3876 to S.Amdt. 3874 to H.R. 2764, Vote #438, 12/18/07; S.Amdt. 3875 to S.Amdt. 3874 to H.R. 2764, Vote #437, 12/18/07; S.Amdt.3164 to H.R. 3222, Vote #362, 10/3/07; S.Amdt. 2898 to S. Amdt. 2011 to H.R. 1585, Vote #346, 9/21/07; S. Amdt. 2924 to S.Amdt. 2011 to H.R.1585, Vote #345, 9/21/07; S.Amdt.2 087 to S.Amdt. 2011 to H.R. 1585, Vote #252, 7/18/07; S.Amdt. 643 to H.R. 1591, Vote #116, 3/27/07; S.Amdt. 4320 to S. 2766, Vote #182, 6/22/06; S.Amdt. 4442 to S. 2766, Vote #181, 6/22/06; S.Amdt. 2519 to S.1042, Vote #322, 11/15/05)

McCain said it's "not too important" when U.S. troops leave Iraq. This exchange occurred on NBC's Today Show with Matt Lauer:
LAUER: If it's working, senator, do you now have a better estimate of when American forces can come home from Iraq?
McCAIN: No, but that's not too important.

(6/11/08)







Cheerleading for War with Iraq--While Afghanistan was Unfinished

McCain suggested that the war in Iraq could be won with a "smaller" force. "But the fact is I think we could go in with much smaller numbers than we had to do in the past. But I don't believe it's going to be nearly the size and scope that it was in 1991." (CBS News, Face the Nation, 9/15/02)

McCain said winning the war would be "easy." "I know that as successful as I believe we will be, and I believe that the success will be fairly easy, we will still lose some American young men or women." (CNN, 9/24/02)

McCain also said the actual fighting in Iraq would be easy. "We're not going to get into house-to-house fighting in Baghdad. We may have to take out buildings, but we're not going to have a bloodletting of trading American bodies for Iraqi bodies." (CNN, 9/29/02)

Continuing his pattern, McCain also said on MSNBC that we would win the war in Iraq "easily." "But the point is that, one, we will win this conflict. We will win it easily." (MSNBC, 1/22/03)

McCain argued Saddam was "a threat of the first order." Senator McCain said that a policy of containing Iraq to blunt its weapons of mass destruction program is "unsustainable, ineffective, unworkable and dangerous." McCain: "I believe Iraq is a threat of the first order, and only a change of regime will make Iraq a state that does not threaten us and others, and where liberated people assume the rights and responsibilities of freedom." (Speech to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2/13/03)

McCain echoed Bush and Cheney's rationale for going to war. McCain: "We're going to win this victory. Tragically, we will lose American lives. But it will be brief. We're going to find massive evidence of weapons of mass destruction . . . It's going to send the message throughout the Middle East that democracy can take hold in the Middle East." (Fox News, Hannity & Colmes, 2/21/03)



"But I believe, Katie, that the Iraqi people will greet us as liberators." (NBC, 3/20/03)

March 2003: "I believe that this conflict is still going to be relatively short." (NBC, Meet the Press, 3/30/03)

McCain echoed Bush and Cheney's talking points that the U.S. would only be in Iraq for a short time. McCain: "It's clear that the end is very much in sight . . . It won't be long . . . it'll be a fairly short period of time." (ABC, 4/9/03)

Staunch Defense of the Iraq Invasion

McCain maintained that the war was a good idea and that George W. Bush deserved "admiration." At the 2004 Republican National Convention, McCain, focusing on the war in Iraq, said that while weapons of mass destruction were not found, Saddam once had them and "he would have acquired them again." McCain said the mission in Iraq "gave hope to people long oppressed" and it was "necessary, achievable and noble." McCain: "For his determination to undertake it, and for his unflagging resolve to see it through to a just end, President Bush deserves not only our support, but our admiration." (Speech, Republican National Convention, 8/31/04)

Senator McCain: "The war, the invasion was not a mistake. (Meet the Press, 1/6/08)



McCain said the war in Iraq was "worth" it. Asked if the war was a good idea worth the price in blood and treasure, McCain: "It was worth getting rid of Saddam Hussein. He had used weapons of mass destruction, and it's clear that he was hell-bent on acquiring them." (Republican Debate, 1/24/08)




Dangerous Lack of Foreign Policy Knowledge

When questioned about Osama bin Laden after the 1998 U.S. missile strikes in Afghanistan, McCain surmised that the terrorist leader wasn't as "bad" as "depicted." "You could say, Look, is this guy, Laden, really the bad guy that's depicted? Most of us have never heard of him before." (Interview with Mother Jones magazine, 11/1998)

McCain was unaware of previous Sunni-Shia violence before the Iraq War. "There's not a history of clashes that are violent between Sunnis and Shias. So I think they can probably get along." (MSNBC, Hardball, 4/23/03)



McCain said our military could just "muddle through" in Afghanistan. While giving a speech, McCain was asked about Afghanistan and replied, "I am concerned about it, but I'm not as concerned as I am about Iraq today, obviously, or I'd be talking about Afghanistan. But I believe that if Karzai can make the progress that he is making, that in the long term, we may muddle through in Afghanistan." (Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, 11/5/03)



McCain stated that Sunni al Qaeda was "supported" by the Shia Iranians. (2/2008)



McCain again confused Sunni Muslim al Qaeda operatives with Shi'a Muslim insurgents. The Washington Post reported of McCain: "He said several times that Iran, a predominately Shiite country, was supplying the mostly Sunni militant group, al-Qaeda. In fact, officials have said they believe Iran is helping Shiite extremists in Iraq.
"Speaking to reporters in Amman, the Jordanian capital, McCain said he and two Senate colleagues traveling with him continue to be concerned about Iranian operatives 'taking al-Qaeda into Iran, training them and sending them back.'

"Pressed to elaborate, McCain said it was 'common knowledge and has been reported in the media that al-Qaeda is going back into Iran and receiving training and are coming back into Iraq from Iran, that's well known. And it's unfortunate.'" (Press conference, Amman, Jordan, 3/18/2008)




Yet again, McCain demonstrated that he didn't know whether al Qaeda was a Sunni or Shiite organization. While questioning General David Petraeus during a Senate hearing, the following exchange occurred:
MCCAIN: Do you still view al Qaeda in Iraq as a major threat?
PETRAEUS: It is still a major threat, though it is certainly not as major a threat as it was say 15 months ago.
MCCAIN: Certainly not an obscure sect of the Shi'ites overall?
PETREAUS: No.
MCCAIN: Or Sunnis or anybody else. (Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 4/8/08)




McCain incorrectly thought General David Petraeus was in charge of Afghanistan. The Army Times reported: "Speaking Monday at the annual meeting of the Associated Press, McCain was asked whether he, if elected, would shift combat troops from Iraq to Afghanistan to intensify the search for al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.
'I would not do that unless Gen. [David] Petraeus said that he felt that the situation called for that,' McCain said, referring to the top U.S. commander in Iraq.

"Petraeus, however, made clear last week that he has nothing to do with the decision. Testifying last week before four congressional committees, including the Senate Armed Services Committee on which McCain is the ranking Republican, Petraeus said the decision about whether troops could be shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan was not his responsibility because his portfolio is limited to the multi-national force in Iraq." (Annual meeting of the Associated Press, 4/14/08)




McCain credited the "surge" for the "Anbar Awakening"--even though the Anbar Awakening preceded the surge by nearly a year. (7/22/08)

John McCain has also recently demonstrated either serious knowledge gaps in terms of foreign policy, or mounting confusion, when discussing an array of other countries:
Spain: McCain refused to commit to meeting with the president of Spain, a NATO ally, after becoming confused about America's relationship with Spain, its leader, and, possibly, exactly where Spain is located. (9/17/08)



Czech Republic and Slovakia: McCain referred to the two countries using the name "Czechoslovakia" several times--despite the fact that Czechoslakia split apart and hasn't existed since 1993. (7/15/08; (7/14/08))





Venezuela: McCain said that Venezuela was a Middle Eastern country. (9/30/08)



Brandon Friedman :: McCain's Miserable Record of Not Supporting America's Troops and Veterans

Please go to this web site and watch the video's that Brandon Friedman has located and posted at Vote Vets McCains Video's compiled by Brandon

Sphere: Related Content

Voting Against Veterans

Dear Michael Bailey,

In recent presidential debates, Senator John McCain has said things like, "I know the veterans. I know them well. And, I know that they know that I'll take care of them." It was stunning, because nothing could be further from the truth. It's something that our friend Charlie Fink even made an issue of in his new video at Lunatics and Liars.

A lot of you have asked VoteVets.org to explain why Senator McCain gets consistently low ratings from veterans groups. Below is a full list of votes, statements, and positions of Senator McCain's, which shows that Senator McCain has consistently bailed on troops and veterans.

It's a very long, but comprehensive list. I encourage you to take a look and pass it around. An even more robust list, complete with video, can be found at VetVoice.com, as well.

Sincerely,

Brandon Friedman
Iraq and Afghanistan War Veteran
Vice Chairman, VoteVets.org

Senator John McCain’s Record on Troop and Veterans’ Issues





Voting Against Veterans



· Veterans Groups Give McCain Failing Grades. In its most recent legislative ratings, the non-partisan Disabled American Veterans gave Sen. McCain a 20 percent rating for his voting record on veterans’ issues. Similarly, the non-partisan Iraq & Afghanistan Veterans of America gave McCain a "D" grade for his poor voting record on veterans’ issues, including McCain’s votes against additional body armor for troops in combat and additional funding for PTSD and TBI screening and treatment.



· McCain Voted Against Increased Funding for Veterans’ Health Care. Although McCain told voters at a campaign rally that improving veterans’ health care was his top domestic priority, he voted against increasing funding for veterans’ health care in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. (Greenville News, 12/12/2007; S.Amdt. 2745 to S.C.R. 95, Vote 40, 3/10/04; Senate S.C.R. 18, Vote 55, 3/16/05; S.Amdt. 3007 to S.C.R. 83, Vote 41, 3/14/06; H.R. 1591, Vote 126, 3/29/07)



· McCain Voted At Least 28 Times Against Veterans’ Benefits, Including Healthcare. Since arriving in the U.S. Senate in 1987, McCain has voted at least 28 times against ensuring important benefits for America’s veterans, including providing adequate healthcare. (2006 Senate Vote #7, 41, 63, 67, 98, 222; 2005 Senate Votes #55, 89, 90, 251, 343; 2004 Senate Votes #40, 48, 145; 2003 Senate Votes #74, 81, 83; 1999 Senate Vote #328; 1998 Senate Vote #175; 1997 Senate Vote #168; 1996 Senate Votes #115, 275; 1995 Senate Votes #76, 226, 466; 1994 Senate Vote #306; 1992 Senate Vote #194; 1991 Senate Vote #259)



· McCain Voted Against Providing Automatic Cost-of-Living Adjustments to Veterans. McCain voted against providing automatic annual cost-of-living adjustments for certain veterans’ benefits. (S. 869, Vote 259, 11/20/91)



· McCain Voted to Underfund Department of Veterans Affairs. McCain voted for an appropriations bill that underfunded the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development by $8.9 billion. (H.R. 2099, Vote 470, 9/27/95)



· McCain Voted Against a $13 Billion Increase in Funding for Veterans Programs. McCain voted against an amendment to increase spending on veterans programs by $13 billion. (S.C.R. 57, Vote 115, 5/16/96)



· McCain Voted Against $44.3 Billion for Veterans Programs. McCain was one of five senators to vote against a bill providing $44.3 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs, plus funding for other federal agencies. (H.R. 2684, Vote 328, 10/15/99)



· McCain Voted Against $47 Billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs. McCain was one of eight senators to vote against a bill that provided $47 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs. (H.R. 4635, Vote 272, 10/12/00)



· McCain Voted Against $51 Billion in Veterans Funding. McCain was one of five senators to vote against the bill and seven to vote against the conference report that provided $51.1 billion for the Department of Veterans Affairs, as well as funding for the federal housing, environmental and emergency management agencies and NASA. (H.R. 2620, Vote 334, 11/8/01; Vote 269, 8/2/01)



· McCain Voted Against $122.7 Billion for Department of Veterans Affairs. McCain voted against an appropriations bill that included $122.7 billion in fiscal 2004 for the Department of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development and other related agencies. (H.R. 2861, Vote 449, 11/12/03)



· McCain Opposed $500 Million for Counseling Services for Veterans with Mental Disorders. McCain voted against an amendment to appropriate $500 million annually from 2006-2010 for counseling, mental health and rehabilitation services for veterans diagnosed with mental illness, posttraumatic stress disorder or substance abuse. (S. 2020, S.Amdt. 2634, Vote 343, 11/17/05)



· McCain opposed an Assured Funding Stream for Veterans’ Health Care. McCain opposed providing an assured funding stream for veterans’ health care, taking into account annual changes in veterans’ population and inflation. (S.Amdt. 3141 to S.C.R. 83, Vote 63, 3/16/06)



· McCain Voted Against Adding More Than $400 Million for Veterans’ Care. McCain was one of 13 Republicans to vote against providing an additional $430 million to the Department of Veterans Affairs for outpatient care and treatment for veterans. (S.Amdt. 3642 to H.R. 4939, Vote 98, 4/26/06)



· McCain Supported Outsourcing VA Jobs. McCain opposed an amendment that would have prevented the Department of Veterans Affairs from outsourcing jobs, many held by blue-collar veterans, without first giving the workers a chance to compete. (S.Amdt. 2673 to H.R. 2642, Vote 315, 9/6/07)



· McCain Opposed the 21st Century GI Bill Because It Was Too Generous. McCain did not vote on the GI Bill that will provide better educational opportunities to veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, paying full tuition at in-state schools and living expenses for those who have served at least three years since the 9/11 attacks. McCain said he opposes the bill because he thinks the generous benefits would "encourage more people to leave the military." (S.Amdt. 4803 to H.R. 2642, Vote 137, 5/22/08; Chattanooga Times Free Press, 6/2/08; Boston Globe, 5/23/08; ABCNews.com, 5/26/08)



· Disabled American Veterans Legislative Director Said That McCain’s Proposal Would Increase Costs For Veterans Because His Plan Relies On Private Hospitals Which Are More Expensive and Which Could Also Lead To Further Rationing Of Care. "To help veterans who live far from VA hospitals or need specialized care the VA can’t provide, McCain proposed giving low-income veterans and those who incurred injury during their service a card they could use at private hospitals. The proposal is not an attempt to privatize the VA, as critics have alleged, but rather, an effort to improve care and access to it, he said. Joe Violanti, legislative director of the Disabled American Veterans, a nonpartisan organization, said the proposal would increase costs because private hospitals are more expensive. The increased cost could lead to further rationing of care, he said." (Las Vegas Sun, 8/10/08)





Lack of Support for the Troops



· McCain co-sponsored the Use of Force Authorization. McCain supported the bill that gave President George W. Bush the green light--and a blank check--for going to war with Iraq. (SJ Res 46, 10/3/02)



· McCain Opposed Increasing Spending on TRICARE and Giving Greater Access to National Guard and Reservists. Although his campaign website devotes a large section to veterans issues, including expanding benefits for reservists and members of the National Guard, McCain voted against increasing spending on the TRICARE program by $20.3 billion over 10 years to give members of the National Guard and Reserves and their families greater access to the health care program. The increase would be offset by a reduction in tax cuts for the wealthy. (S.Amdt. 324 to S.C.R. 23, Vote 81, 3/25/03)



· McCain voted against holding Bush accountable for his actions in the war. McCain opposed the creation of an independent commission to investigate the development and use of intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq. (S.Amdt. 1275 to H.R. 2658, Vote 284, 7/16/03)



· McCain voted Against Establishing a $1 Billion Trust Fund for Military Health Facilities. McCain voted against establishing a $1 billion trust fund to improve military health facilities by refusing to repeal tax cuts for those making more than $1 million a year. (S.Amdt. 2735 to S.Amdt. 2707 to H.R. 4297, Vote 7, 2/2/06)



· Senator McCain opposed efforts to end the overextension of the military--a policy that is having a devastating impact on our troops. McCain voted against requiring mandatory minimum downtime between tours of duty for troops serving in Iraq. (S.Amdt.. 2909 to S.Amdt. 2011 to HR 1585, Vote 341, 9/19/07; S.Amdt. 2012 to S.Amdt. 2011 to HR 1585, Vote 241, 7/11/07)



· McCain announced his willingness to keep U.S. troops in Iraq for decades--a statement sure to inflame Iraqis and endanger American troops. McCain: "Make it a hundred" years in Iraq and "that would be fine with me." (Derry, New Hampshire Town Hall meeting, 1/3/08)



· McCain voted against a ban on waterboarding--a form of torture--in a move that could eventually endanger American troops. According to ThinkProgress, "the Senate brought the Intelligence Authorization Bill to the floor, which contained a provision from Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) establishing one interrogation standard across the government. The bill requires the intelligence community to abide by the same standards as articulated in the Army Field Manual and bans waterboarding." McCain voted against the bill. (H.R. 2082, Vote 22, 2/13/08)



· McCain Also Supported Outsourcing at Walter Reed. McCain opposed an amendment to prevent the outsourcing of 350 federal employee jobs at Walter Reed Army Medical Center--outsourcing that contributed to the scandalous treatment of veterans at Walter Reed that McCain called a "disgrace." (S.Amdt. 4895 to H.R. 5631, Vote 234, 9/6/06; Speech to VFW in Kansas City, Mo., 4/4/08)



· Senator McCain has consistently opposed any plan to withdraw troops from Iraq--a policy that has directly weakened American efforts in Afghanistan. Senator McCain repeatedly voted against a timetable for withdrawing troops from Iraq. (S.Amdt. 3876 to S.Amdt. 3874 to H.R. 2764, Vote #438, 12/18/07; S.Amdt. 3875 to S.Amdt. 3874 to H.R. 2764, Vote #437, 12/18/07; S.Amdt.3164 to H.R. 3222, Vote #362, 10/3/07; S.Amdt. 2898 to S. Amdt. 2011 to H.R. 1585, Vote #346, 9/21/07; S. Amdt. 2924 to S.Amdt. 2011 to H.R.1585, Vote #345, 9/21/07; S.Amdt.2 087 to S.Amdt. 2011 to H.R. 1585, Vote #252, 7/18/07; S.Amdt. 643 to H.R. 1591, Vote #116, 3/27/07; S.Amdt. 4320 to S. 2766, Vote #182, 6/22/06; S.Amdt. 4442 to S. 2766, Vote #181, 6/22/06; S.Amdt. 2519 to S.1042, Vote #322, 11/15/05)



· McCain said it’s "not too important" when U.S. troops leave Iraq. This exchange occurred on NBC’s Today Show with Matt Lauer:



LAUER: If it's working, senator, do you now have a better estimate of when American forces can come home from Iraq?
McCAIN: No, but that's not too important.



(NBC, Today Show, 6/11/08)





Cheerleading for War with Iraq--While Afghanistan was Unfinished



· McCain suggested that the war in Iraq could be won with a "smaller" force. "But the fact is I think we could go in with much smaller numbers than we had to do in the past. But I don't believe it's going to be nearly the size and scope that it was in 1991." (CBS News, Face the Nation, 9/15/02)



· McCain said winning the war would be "easy." "I know that as successful as I believe we will be, and I believe that the success will be fairly easy, we will still lose some American young men or women." (CNN, 9/24/02)



· McCain also said the actual fighting in Iraq would be easy. "We’re not going to get into house-to-house fighting in Baghdad. We may have to take out buildings, but we’re not going to have a bloodletting of trading American bodies for Iraqi bodies." (CNN, 9/29/02)



· Continuing his pattern, McCain also said on MSNBC that we would win the war in Iraq "easily." "But the point is that, one, we will win this conflict. We will win it easily." (MSNBC, 1/22/03)



· McCain argued Saddam was "a threat of the first order." Senator McCain said that a policy of containing Iraq to blunt its weapons of mass destruction program is "unsustainable, ineffective, unworkable and dangerous." McCain: "I believe Iraq is a threat of the first order, and only a change of regime will make Iraq a state that does not threaten us and others, and where liberated people assume the rights and responsibilities of freedom." (Speech to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2/13/03)



· McCain echoed Bush and Cheney’s rationale for going to war. McCain: "We're going to win this victory. Tragically, we will lose American lives. But it will be brief. We’re going to find massive evidence of weapons of mass destruction . . . It’s going to send the message throughout the Middle East that democracy can take hold in the Middle East." (Fox News, Hannity & Colmes, 2/21/03)



· "But I believe, Katie, that the Iraqi people will greet us as liberators." (NBC, 3/20/03)



· March 2003: "I believe that this conflict is still going to be relatively short." (NBC, Meet the Press, 3/30/03)



· McCain echoed Bush and Cheney’s talking points that the U.S. would only be in Iraq for a short time. McCain: "It’s clear that the end is very much in sight . . . It won’t be long . . . it’ll be a fairly short period of time." (ABC, 4/9/03)





Staunch Defense of the Iraq Invasion



· McCain maintained that the war was a good idea and that George W. Bush deserved "admiration." At the 2004 Republican National Convention, McCain, focusing on the war in Iraq, said that while weapons of mass destruction were not found, Saddam once had them and "he would have acquired them again." McCain said the mission in Iraq "gave hope to people long oppressed" and it was "necessary, achievable and noble." McCain: "For his determination to undertake it, and for his unflagging resolve to see it through to a just end, President Bush deserves not only our support, but our admiration." (Speech, Republican National Convention, 8/31/04)



· Senator McCain: "The war, the invasion was not a mistake. (Meet the Press, 1/6/08)



· McCain said the war in Iraq was "worth" it. Asked if the war was a good idea worth the price in blood and treasure, McCain: "It was worth getting rid of Saddam Hussein. He had used weapons of mass destruction, and it's clear that he was hell-bent on acquiring them." (Republican Debate, 1/24/08)





Dangerous Lack of Foreign Policy Knowledge



· When questioned about Osama bin Laden after the 1998 U.S. missile strikes in Afghanistan, McCain surmised that the terrorist leader wasn’t as "bad" as "depicted." "You could say, Look, is this guy, Laden, really the bad guy that's depicted? Most of us have never heard of him before." (Interview with Mother Jones magazine, 11/1998)



· McCain was unaware of previous Sunni-Shia violence before the Iraq War. "There’s not a history of clashes that are violent between Sunnis and Shias. So I think they can probably get along." (MSNBC, Hardball, 4/23/03)



· McCain said our military could just "muddle through" in Afghanistan. While giving a speech, McCain was asked about Afghanistan and replied, "I am concerned about it, but I’m not as concerned as I am about Iraq today, obviously, or I’d be talking about Afghanistan. But I believe that if Karzai can make the progress that he is making, that in the long term, we may muddle through in Afghanistan." (Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, 11/5/03)



· McCain stated that Sunni al Qaeda was "supported" by the Shia Iranians. (2/2008)



· McCain again confused Sunni Muslim al Qaeda operatives with Shi’a Muslim insurgents. The Washington Post reported of McCain: "He said several times that Iran, a predominately Shiite country, was supplying the mostly Sunni militant group, al-Qaeda. In fact, officials have said they believe Iran is helping Shiite extremists in Iraq.

"Speaking to reporters in Amman, the Jordanian capital, McCain said he and two Senate colleagues traveling with him continue to be concerned about Iranian operatives ‘taking al-Qaeda into Iran, training them and sending them back.’

"Pressed to elaborate, McCain said it was ‘common knowledge and has been reported in the media that al-Qaeda is going back into Iran and receiving training and are coming back into Iraq from Iran, that's well known. And it's unfortunate.’" (Press conference, Amman, Jordan, 3/18/2008)



· Yet again, McCain demonstrated that he didn’t know whether al Qaeda was a Sunni or Shiite organization. While questioning General David Petraeus during a Senate hearing, the following exchange occurred:



MCCAIN: Do you still view al Qaeda in Iraq as a major threat?
PETRAEUS: It is still a major threat, though it is certainly not as major a threat as it was say 15 months ago.
MCCAIN: Certainly not an obscure sect of the Shi'ites overall?
PETREAUS: No.
MCCAIN: Or Sunnis or anybody else.



(Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, 4/8/08)



· McCain incorrectly thought General David Petraeus was in charge of Afghanistan. The Army Times reported: "Speaking Monday at the annual meeting of the Associated Press, McCain was asked whether he, if elected, would shift combat troops from Iraq to Afghanistan to intensify the search for al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.



‘I would not do that unless Gen. (David) Petraeus said that he felt that the situation called for that,’ McCain said, referring to the top U.S. commander in Iraq.



"Petraeus, however, made clear last week that he has nothing to do with the decision. Testifying last week before four congressional committees, including the Senate Armed Services Committee on which McCain is the ranking Republican, Petraeus said the decision about whether troops could be shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan was not his responsibility because his portfolio is limited to the multi-national force in Iraq." (Annual meeting of the Associated Press, 4/14/08)



· McCain credited the "surge" for the "Anbar Awakening"--even though the Anbar Awakening preceded the surge by nearly a year. (7/22/08)



· John McCain has also recently demonstrated either serious knowledge gaps in terms of foreign policy, or mounting confusion, when discussing an array of other countries:



Spain: McCain refused to commit to meeting with the president of Spain, a NATO ally, after becoming confused about America’s relationship with Spain, its leader, and, possibly, exactly where Spain is located. (9/17/08)


Czech Republic and Slovakia: McCain referred to the two countries using the name "Czechoslovakia" several times--despite the fact that Czechoslakia split apart and hasn't existed since 1993. (7/15/08; (7/14/08))


Venezuela: McCain said that Venezuela was a Middle Eastern country. (9/30/08)

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Sphere: Related Content

health eligibility Combat Operations

http://www.va.gov/healtheligibility/Library/pubs/CombatOperations/CombatOperations.pdf

or at: http://tinyurl.com/3ss334

VA Issues Directive Controlling 5 Year VA Health Care Program For OIF/OEF Veterans-Below please find the long VA directive controlling the enlarged 5 year program which qualifies OIF/OEF veterans for 5 years of VA healthcare without a service connected disability. When this program started it was a 2 year program but in January of this year the President signed a bill lengthening the qualification time to 5 years. As you can see in the directive if you are one of the beneficiaries who enrolled in the 2 year program and finished those two years you will be requalified for the remaining 3 years. When you are in this program you are placed in Category 6 “Special Enrollment Category” but after the 5 years you will continue to be enrolled at the VA now in Category 7 or 8. In these very difficult financial times we strongly suggest that if you qualify you should immediately take advantage of this program. You should then go to the VA at least once a year to maintain your VA healthcare enrollment qualification after your 5 years are over. This can provide you with a first rate medical coverage backup that you would be foolish accept.
VHA DIRECTIVE 2008-054
September 9, 2008

COMBAT VETERAN HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND COPAY EXEMPTION POST-DISCHARGE FROM MILITARY SERVICE

1. PURPOSE: This Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Directive establishes the policy and procedures for determining eligibility for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care benefits and copayment exemption for recently discharged veterans who served in a theater of combat operations after November 11, 1998.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Title 38, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 1710(e)(1)(D) states that a veteran who served on active duty in a theater of combat operations (as determined by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense) during a period of war after the Persian Gulf War, or in combat against a hostile force during a period of hostilities after November 11, 1998, is eligible for hospital care, medical services, and nursing home care for any illness, even if there is insufficient medical evidence to conclude that such condition is attributable to such service. For purposes of this policy, such veterans are considered to qualify as “combat veterans.” Treatment provided under this authority is not subject to copayment requirements.

b. Combat veterans who are treated for a condition that the VA provider finds resulted from a cause other than combat service may, however, be subject to copayments (see subpar. 4c(5), for conditions that the Under Secretary for Health has determined are not related to combat service).

c. On January 28, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law the “National Defense Authorization Act of 2008”(NDAA), Public Law 110-181. This law, among other things, amended Title 38, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 1710(e)(3), extending the period in which a combat-theater veteran may enroll for VA health care and receive the care and services described in preceding paragraph 2a. The law now provides that:

(1) Combat veterans who were discharged or released from active service on or after

January 28, 2003, are eligible to enroll for VA health care for 5 years from the date of discharge or release and are to be placed in Priority Group (PG) 6 (unless eligible for a higher PG placement). This means that combat-theater veterans who were originally enrolled in PG 6 based on their combat service, but later moved to a lower priority category (due to the law’s former 2-year eligibility limitation) are to be placed back in PG 6 for 5 years beginning on the date of their discharge or release from active service. New combat-theater veterans have 5 years from the date of their discharge or release to enroll for VA health care. NOTE: The 5-year enrollment period applicable to these veterans begins on the discharge or separation date of the service member from active duty military service, or in the case of multiple call-ups, the most recent discharge date.

THIS VHA DIRECTIVE EXPIRES SEPTEMBER 30, 2013

(2) Combat veterans who were discharged from active duty before January 28, 2003, but did not enroll in VA’s health care system have 3 years under this authority to enroll in VA’s health care system. This 3-year period of enhanced eligibility begins on January 28, 2008, and expires after January 27, 2011, during which time the combat veteran will be placed in PG 6 (unless eligible for higher PG placement).

d. National Guard and Reserve members who were activated to serve in the Armed Forces and served in a combat theater of operations are eligible to receive health care benefits under

38 U.S.C. 1710(e)(1)(D) if they meet the title 38 definition of “veteran,” as defined in 38 U.S.C. 101(2), and meet the “minimum active duty” service requirement, set forth in 38 U.S.C. 5303A (or are exempt from that statutory requirement).

3. POLICY: It is VHA policy that combat-theater veterans who meet the eligibility criteria of 38 U.S.C Section 1710(e)(1)(D) and who apply for VA health care within the applicable timeframe are to be enrolled in PG 6 (unless eligible for a higher PG placement) and are to receive care and services at no cost for any illness or condition possibly related to their combat service. Combat-theater veterans who were moved from PG 6 to a lower priority PG (based on the law’s former 2-year limitation for eligibility in this category) must be placed back in PG 6 (unless eligible for a higher PG placement) for 5 years beginning from the date of their discharge or release. NOTE: VA regulations exempt combat-theater veterans from copayment requirements that apply to the receipt of medications if the medications were furnished for conditions covered under this special treatment and enrollment authority.

4. ACTION

a. Under Secretary for Health. The Under Secretary for Health has designated the Chief Business Officer (CBO), as the lead VHA officer for establishing policy in determining veterans’ eligibility for health benefits.

b. CBO

(1) The CBO, or designee, in consultation with the Chief Public Health and Environmental Hazards Officer (13) and the Chief Readjustment Counseling Service Officer (15) is responsible for providing guidance concerning locations, dates of service, and other criteria that are used to identify service in theaters of combat operations or subject to hostilities.

(2) The CBO is responsible for providing guidance relating to the evidence or documentation needed to determine a veteran’s eligibility for these combat-related health benefits. NOTE: Specific locations that have been designated as theaters of combat or areas subject to hostilities qualifying for combat veteran status are provided in Attachment A and will be updated as changes in combat designations occur.

c. Facility Director. Each facility Director is responsible for ensuring that:

(1) Facility staff involved in the eligibility process and staff involved in the provision of health care services are provided guidance on verifying a combat veteran’s eligibility and providing appropriate services, respectively.

(2) Combat-theater veterans who enroll within the applicable enrollment timeframe are placed in PG 6 (unless eligible for higher PG placement) and receive free VA care and services for any condition that may be related to their combat service, consistent with law.

(3) While combat-theater veterans enrolled in PG 6 are not required to disclose income information, intake staff are trained to clearly articulate the benefits of providing this income information. These benefits may include a higher enrollment PG assignment, exemption from copayments for care and medication provided for treatment of non-combat related conditions, or eligibility for beneficiary travel benefits. If the combat veteran declines to provide income information, the combat veteran must agree to pay any applicable copayments for care that is found by VHA not to be related to combat service.

(4) VHA clinicians have wide latitude in determining if a veteran’s condition may be possibly related to the veteran’s combat service. This clinical determination does not require the same rigor or standards used for adjudication of a service-connected claim. It is a determination solely within the medical judgment of the treating clinician. In general, VHA clinicians need to conclude that illnesses and conditions requiring treatment or monitoring during the combat veteran’s enhanced enrollment period (i.e., 5 or 3 year-period post-discharge or release, as applicable) are possibly related to combat service. Physical or mental health evaluations needed to rule out combat-related health concerns are to be provided at no cost to the enrolled combat veterans and deemed to be a health care service covered under 38 U.S.C. 1710(e)(1)(D). However, the Under Secretary for Health has determined that certain conditions will invariably be deemed to be due to causes other than combat service. These include, but are not limited to:

(a) Congenital or developmental conditions, e.g., scoliosis.

(b) Conditions which are known to have existed before military service unless there is an indication that the condition has been aggravated or exacerbated by combat service.

(c) Conditions having a specific and well-established etiology and that began after military combat service, e.g., bone fractures occurring after separation from military service, a common cold, etc.

(5) If the condition is clearly found to have resulted from a cause other than the veteran’s combat service, the clinician must change the Combat Veteran treatment factor value in the Computer Patient Record System (CPRS) to “No” for that encounter and copayment charges may apply.

(6) Appropriate staff are furnished Attachment A, which contains the locations and periods of service that qualify as theaters of combat operations. NOTE: These criteria are updated as necessary.

(7) Appropriate staff are aware of evidence or documentation that may be accepted as an individual veteran’s proof of combat service, these include: NOTE: Only one is required.

(a) Notations on the DD 214 of service in a designated theater of combat operations;

(b) Receipt of the Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; Kosovo Campaign Medal; Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal (does not include Global War on Terrorism Service Medal); Southwest Asia Campaign Medal; Air Force Combat Action Medal (AFCAM) or other DoD authorized combat related medal; and

(c) Proof of receipt of Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay (commonly referred to as “combat pay”) or combat tax exemption after November 11, 1998.

NOTE: Other evidence may be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

(8) Continuous enrollment for veterans who are enrolled in PG 6.

(a) Veterans will continue to be enrolled in VA’s health care system after their enhanced enrollment period ends. At that time, VA reassesses the veteran’s information (including all applicable eligibility factors) and makes a new enrollment priority determination.

(b) If the veteran was in PG 6 and no other eligibility factors apply, then the veteran is moved to either PG 7 or PG 8 depending on the income level. As a result of the expiration of the enhanced enrollment period, the veteran may be required to make applicable copayments.

(9) Combat-theater veterans who do not enroll within the applicable enrollment period are still eligible to enroll for VA health care, unless they are subject to the administrative ban on enrolling new veterans in PG 8. Their enrollment must be based on factors other than combat service, such as: a compensable service-connected disability, VA pension status, catastrophic disability determination, or the veteran’s financial circumstances. Even if they have no current need for medical care or services they should be strongly encouraged to apply for enrollment within the applicable timeframe to preserve their eligibility for enrollment.

(10) Combat-theater veterans who are ineligible to enroll for VA care are referred to a Vet Center for readjustment counseling services, if appropriate, or to a community provider to obtain services at the veteran’s expense.

(11) If a health care emergency exists for an ineligible veteran, treatment is provided under VA’s humanitarian treatment authority.

(12) Combat veterans who believe they incurred disabilities during service are encouraged to apply for service-connection. NOTE: Veterans Service Organizations can be of great value in assisting veterans with this process.

NOTE: VA Environmental Health programs (formerly designated as Registry programs) may provide Gulf War Registry examinations to eligible veterans who request the examination and who served on active military duty in Southwest Asia during the Gulf War which began in 1990 and continues to the present including Operation Iraqi Freedom. The GW Environmental Health program is described in VHA Handbook 1303.02, accessible on Web site http://www1.va.gov/GulfWar/.

5. REFERENCES

a. VHA Handbook 1303.5.

b. Title 38 U.S.C. Sections 101(2) and (21), 1710, 1712A, and 5303A.

c. Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act of 2008.

6. FOLLOW-UP RESPONSIBILITY: The Chief Business Officer (16) and the Chief Public Health and Environmental Hazards Officer (13) are jointly responsible for the content of this Directive. Questions about combat veteran’s eligibility may be addressed to Business Policy at (202) 254-0406. Questions about veterans seeking treatment for health conditions claimed to be related to combat operations may be addressed to the Environmental Agents Service (131) at (202) 273-8597.

7. RESCISSIONS: VHA Directive 2005-020, and VHA Directive 2002-049 are rescinded. This VHA Directive September 30, 2012.

Michael J. Kussman, MD, MS, MACP
Under Secretary for Health

ATTACHMENT A
COMBAT VETERAN ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION TABLE
COMBAT ZONES, HOSTILITIES and MEDALS

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) utilizes the Department of Defense (DOD) “Combat Zones” listing of designated hostile fire or imminent danger pay areas. Although DOD Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger pay existed prior to November 11, 1998, only proof of such pay after November 11, 1998, is acceptable. NOTE: The table provided at the link provided should assist in the determination of combat veteran eligibility.

1. Definitions

a. Combat Veteran. A combat veteran is a veteran who served on active duty in a theater of combat operations during a period of war after the Persian Gulf War or in combat against a hostile force during a period of hostilities after November 11, 1998.

b. Combat Zones. Combat zones are designated by an Executive Order from the President as areas in which the United States (U.S.) Armed Forces are engaging or have engaged in combat. An area usually becomes a combat zone and ceases to be a combat zone on the dates the President designates by Executive Order.

c. Minimum Active Duty Service Requirement. The minimum active duty service requirement is the shorter of the following two periods:

(1) The full period for which they were enlisted, called or ordered to active duty, or

(2) Twenty-four months of continuous active duty.

NOTE: There remain categories of veterans who are expressly excluded by statute from the minimum active duty service requirement; e.g., veterans who were discharged or released from active duty for a disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty, those discharged or released from active duty under an early out or hardship discharge, etc.

d. Hostilities. Hostilities refers to conflict in which the members of the Armed Forces are subjected to danger comparable to the danger to which members of the Armed Forces have been subjected in a theater of combat operations during a period of war. To determine whether a period of hostilities is within the scope of this special authority, VA relies upon the same citation and criterion used to determine eligibility for VA Readjustment Counseling Service contained in 38 U.S.C., Section 1712A(a)(2)(B), as it applies to veterans in service after November 11, 1998. More specifically, criteria used to determine whether a veteran’s service meets the qualifications required by statute include:

(1) Receipt of an expeditionary medal or other DOD authorized combat related medal;

(2) Service in a location designated by an Executive Order as a combat zone;

(3) Receipt of DOD Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger pay or combat pay tax exemption for serving in the area subject to hostilities; or

(4) Other factors as may be defined in policy and regulation by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.

NOTE: A certificate of award, or presentation of a medal, in and of itself, will not suffice for VA health care eligibility verification purposes without the submission of supporting documentation (such as DD 214, Proof of Receipt of Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay, proof of exemption of Federal tax status for Hostile Fire or Imminent Danger Pay after November 11, 1998), other military service records or orders indicating combat service.

e. Hostilities or Imminent Danger Pay. Hostile fire pay is defined as pay to anyone exposed to hostile fire or mine explosion, while imminent danger pay is paid to anyone on duty outside the United States area who is subject to physical harm or imminent danger due to wartime conditions, terrorism, civil insurrection, or civil war.

f. Medals. Afghanistan Campaign Medal, Iraq Campaign Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal (does not include Global War on Terrorism Medal); Kosovo Campaign Medal; Southwest Asia Campaign Medal; and other DOD-authorized combat related medals.

NOTE: This listing is current as of the date of publication of this directive. For the most current listing see http://www.va.gov/healtheligibility/Library/pubs/CombatOperations

Sphere: Related Content

Open Letter to GAO, DOD, Veterans Affairs and Congress

May 2004
CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE
DOD Needs to
Continue to Collect
and Provide
Information on Tests
and on Potentially
Exposed Personnel

To Whom It May Concern, Who do I need to speak with concerning NAS/IOM reports that DOD and the VA use to justify either compensating or not compensating veterans or their widows. I am one of the enlisted men from the human experiments at Edgewood Arsenal in 1974. The Cold War Experiments ran from 1955 thru 1975.

I am also in contact with Jack Alderson, Commander, US Navy, Retired that is a member of the Operation SHAD/112 group and he has many of the same concerns as I have, that we are not getting a fair shake from the Department of Defense and less than complete health studies from the IOM MUFA unit, and DR William Page seems to be at the center of all of the MUFA studies that DOD used to decide compensation criteria for all of the veterans from the different programs, most were incomplete studies or some groups were never studied for long term health effects.

Bottom line, is the veterans have been ill served over the past 33 years since the final classified human experiments were stopped my President Ford in 1975, 33 years ago, many of the veteran are disabled or dead, at rates higher than normal for men our age. Which considering we were the healthiest young men the scientists had to choose from at the time, does not make sense, unless exposures, either deliberate or environmental exposure, or both could have played a part.

This recent manual from the NAS makes it plain that the veterans will never know the truth about the exposures http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11908

Authors:
Committee on Evaluation of the Presumptive Disability Decision-Making Process for Veterans, Jonathan M. Samet and Catherine C. Bodurow, Editors
Authoring Organizations

http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11908&page=298

LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION
Policies governing DoD’s classification program are implemented through the Information Security Program (DoD, 1997). This regulation implements Executive Order 12958 (Clinton, 1995), “Classified National Security Information,” and has been codified at 32 CFR Part 159 (DoD Information Security Program. 2001. 32 C.F.R. § 159). “A security clearance is a determination that a person is eligible for access to classified information. ‘Need to know’ is a determination made by a possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, or knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to accomplish lawful and authorized government purposes” (Pike, 2002). Current levels of classification are broadly contained under the headings of Unclassified, Limited, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, Limited Dissemination (LIMDIS), Special Access Program (SAP), and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) (Pike, 2002). Appendix L-2 provides a discussion of each of the categories of unclassified and classified information control.

No person may have access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized government purposes, that is, the person has the appropriate security clearance and a need to know. Further, cleared personnel may not have access until they have been given an initial security briefing. Procedures are established by the head of each DoD component to prevent unnecessary access to classified information. (Pike, 2002)



There must be a demonstrable need for access to classified information before a request for a personnel security clearance can be initiated. The number of people cleared and granted access to classified information is maintained at the minimum number that is consistent with operational requirements and needs. No one has a right to have access to classified information solely by virtue of rank or position. The final responsibility for determining whether an individual’s official duties require possession of or access to any element or item of classified information, and whether the individual has been granted the appropriate security clearance by proper authority, rests upon the individual who has authorized possession, knowledge, or control of the information and not upon the prospective recipient. (Pike, 2002)

SECRECY AND MEDICAL RESEARCH
Numerous aspects of medical research have been classified on the basis of national security and have only recently been brought to public light. The

ACHRE Report (ACHRE, 1995) enumerated numerous radiation studies conducted during and after World War II which were classified, and some still have not been declassified. Although the Espionage Act of 1918 really began the era of national security classification, more and more documents have been classified with each new Presidential administration (ACHRE, 1995; Quist, 2002). Today the system is complicated and burdensome to use as discussed above. Medical research is still conducted and classified under the aegis of national security. This secrecy classification can establish hindrances in the medical care provided to the participants in these studies. All institutions that participate in medical research have some degree of classification for their projects, depending upon funding sponsor, subject, and agents used. Much of the current research on modern nerve agents, for example, is classified at the secret and above levels, even though there are many unclassified documents on nerve agents available to the public (IOM, 1993). And while DoD participates extensively in classified medical research studies, VA has not been excluded from such activities. Chapter 13 of the ACHRE Report outlined VA participation in maintenance of “confidential” files regarding radiation studies:

VA, similarly, was able to provide fragments of information that show that “confidential” files were kept in anticipation of potential radiation liability claims. However, neither the VA, nor the DOE and DoD (who evidently were parties to this secret record keeping), have been able to determine exactly what secret records were kept and what rules governed their collection and availability. (ACHRE, 1995, ch. 13)

(As explained in Chapter 10 of the ACHRE Report, VA concluded that a “confidential” division contemplated in relation to secret record keeping was not activated.)

VA publications did contain lists of several thousand (nonclassified) human experiments conducted at VA facilities; however, the information was quite fragmentary, and further information could not be readily retrieved (if it still exists) on the vast majority of these experiments. Thus, in looking for answers to questions about the secrecy of data on human experiments and intentional releases, we find record-keeping practices that leave questions about both what secrets were kept and what rules governed the keeping of secrets. (ACHRE, 1995, ch. 13)

Medical research involving human subjects must follow certain ethical and standard practice guidelines such as those established by the Nuremberg Code of 1947 (Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 1949). The 10 key elements of the Nuremberg Code are outlined in Appendix L-3.

Some medical research studies conducted prior to the Nuremburg Code implementation might not have followed the precepts of the code. Congressional inquiries during 1975 and 1976 requested that the Army Inspector General review the use of human volunteers in chemical agent research (IOM, 1993). An excerpted summary of this review (Taylor and Johnson, 1975) is presented in Appendix L-4. While this report concentrated on psychochemical testing conducted during the period 1950-1975, it also addressed the history of chemical warfare testing using human volunteers and the degree of compliance with the Nuremberg Code (IOM, 1993). The overriding conclusion from this report was that the secrecy applied to research using human volunteers “left ample room for misinterpretation, lack of knowledge about [guidelines governing human volunteers] and outright disregard for established policies and guidelines” (Taylor and Johnson, 1975, as referenced in IOM, 1993, p. 379). Concern regarding these conclusions remains today.

The issue of secrecy hindering medical treatment for veterans is amply exhibited in the IOM report Veterans at Risk: The Health Effects of Mustard Gas and Lewisite (IOM, 1993). Serious concerns were enumerated in the report over the secrecy issue demonstrated by DoD



This shows to some extent that the veterans have never been given any type of full access to data regarding the full extent of the experiments, all of the substances, how much of each substance were we exposed to, at what level does damage begin, did the scientists even know?

What effect did the toxins in the drinking water, surface water and soil of the training areas have on the men assigned to Edgewood Arsenal for the experiments, how much of the water was safe to drink, how much of the water did each veteran have to consume before long term health effects were started?

http://cfpub1.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/ccontinfo.cfm?id=0300421 EPA Superfund site data for EA

ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND (EDGEWOOD AREA)
Contaminants

Site Profile | Aliases | Operable Units | Contacts
Actions | Contaminants | Site-Specific Documents



The below list only includes contaminants identified as contaminants of concern (COCs) for this site. COCs are the site-specific chemical substances that the health assessor selects for further evaluation of potential health effects. Identifying contaminants of concern is a process that requires the assessor to examine contaminant concentrations at the site, the quality of environmental sampling data and the potential for human exposure.

Media Contaminant Contaminant Group
Groundwater 1,1,1,2-TETRACHLOROETHANE VOC
Soil 1,1,2,2-TETRABROMOETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1,2,2-TETRACHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1,2-TRICHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,1-DICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater 1,2,4-TRICHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater 1,2-DICHLOROBENZENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,2-DICHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,2-TRANS-DICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater 1,4-DICHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Soil 2-HEXANONE VOC
Sediment 2-METHYLNAPHTHALENE PAH
Sediment 4,4-DDE Pesticides
Sediment, Soil 4,4-DDT Pesticides
Groundwater ACETONE VOC
Groundwater ALUMINUM (FUME OR DUST) Metals
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water ANTIMONY Metals
Soil AROCLOR 1248 PCBs
Soil AROCLOR 1254 PCBs
Soil AROCLOR 1260 PCBs
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water ARSENIC Metals
Groundwater, Soil BARIUM Metals
Groundwater BENZENE VOC
Soil BENZO(B)FLUORANTHENE PAH
Groundwater BENZOIC ACID Base Neutral Acids
Soil BENZO[A]ANTHRACENE PAH
Sediment, Soil BENZO[A]PYRENE PAH
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil BERYLLIUM Metals
Groundwater BORON OXIDE Inorganics
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water CADMIUM Metals
Groundwater CALCIUM Metals
Soil CALCIUM CARBONATE Inorganics
Groundwater CARBON DISULFIDE VOC
Groundwater CARBON TETRACHLORIDE VOC
Sediment CHLORDANE Pesticides
Groundwater CHLOROBENZENE VOC
Groundwater CHLOROFORM VOC
Groundwater, Soil CHROMIUM Metals
Groundwater CIS-1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater COBALT AND COMPOUNDS Inorganics
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water COPPER Metals
Groundwater CYANIDE Inorganics
Soil DIBENZO(A,H)ANTHRACENE PAH
Groundwater ETHYLBENZENE VOC
Soil HEPTACHLOR Pesticides
Soil HEPTACHLOR EPOXIDE Pesticides
Soil HEXACHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater HEXACHLOROBUTADIENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater, Soil HEXACHLOROETHANE VOC
Soil INDENO(1,2,3-CD)PYRENE PAH
Solid Waste INORGANICS Inorganics
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water IRON Metals
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water LEAD Metals
Soil LEWISITE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater, Sediment MAGNESIUM Metals
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water MANGANESE Metals
Groundwater, Soil MERCURY Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water METHYLENE CHLORIDE VOC
Soil MUSTARD GAS Organics
Groundwater NICKEL Metals
Groundwater NITRATE Inorganics
Solid Waste NOT PROVIDED Not Provided
Soil OIL & GREASE Oil & Grease
Soil, Solid Waste PCBs PCBs
Sediment PHENANTHRENE PAH
Soil PHOSGENE Pesticides
Soil PHOSPHORUS (YELLOW OR WHITE) Inorganics
Groundwater POTASSIUM Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water SELENIUM Metals
Groundwater, Soil SILVER Metals
Groundwater SODIUM Metals
Groundwater TETRACHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater TETRACHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater, Soil THALLIUM Metals
Groundwater TOLUENE VOC
Groundwater TRANS-1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater TRICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water TRICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater VANADIUM (FUME OR DUST) Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water VINYL CHLORIDE VOC
Solid Waste VOC VOC
Groundwater XYLENES VOC
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water ZINC Metals


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These toxins cause medical problems in every body system there is. Yet the VA refuses to acknowledge we may have been harmed by the exposures, why?



http://www.ehponline.org/members/1994/102-1/munro-full.html Jan 1, 1994 National Institute of Health Report on damage caused by exposure to Sarin and GB this report shows cardiovascular problems related to low level exposures of Sarin yet DR Page ignored it when he wrote his March 2003 IOM Sarin Report based on the Edgewood Arsenal veterans being used as the control group for the veterans exposed at Kamisayah Iraq in March 1991, they also neglected to take into account teh fact that mustard agents were also present in the ammo bunkers at Kamisyah.



If you do not take all substances into account, you get flawed results, it is my understanding that DR Page was working to parameters set by DOD, if this is true, why were the parameters set improperly? Should any of the veterans that were in the control group, also have been in the Middle East where they could have come in contact with the substances during GW1. I don't think DR Page took this into account due to the dates of the experiments and GW1, but some of us were in the national Guard and were activated for GW1.

To me the worst evidence is this work by DR Karl Heinz Lohs based on 30 years of research on Wermacht soldiers from WW2 Germany who worked on their chemical weapons program. DR Lohs treated these men from the end of WW2 until 1974 when this report was written and published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) http://www.sipri.org/contents/cbwarfare/Publications/pdfs/cw-delayed.pdf

Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents

page 40

To conclude this section, the closing observations from Spiegelberg’s monograph
will be cited (these remarks do not refer exclusively to organophosphorus
CW agents) [2]:
A psychiatric delayed-effect syndrome was found as a result of systematic investigations
on former members of CW production and testing stations for the Wehrmacht. In
terms of frequency, two groups of symptoms can be distinguished–each consisting of
four separate symptoms or signs.
(1) The great majority of persons examined showed:
(a) persistently lowered vitality accompanied by marked diminution in drive;
(b) defective autonomic regulation leading to cephalalgia, gastrointestinal and
cardiovascular symptoms, and premature decline in libido and potency;
(c) intolerance symptoms (alcohol, nicotine, medicines);
(d) impression of premature aging.
(2) Further, one or more symptoms of the second group were found:
(a) depressive or subdepressive disorders of vital functions;
(b) cerebral vegetative (syncopal) attacks;
(c) slight or moderate amnestic and demential defects;
(d) slight organoneurological defects (predominantly microsymptoms and singular
signs of extrapyramidal character).
Our results are a contribution to the general question of psychopathological delayed
and permanent lesions caused by industrial poisoning. On the basis of our studies of
the etiologically different manifestations of toxication, the possibility of a relatively
uniform–though equally unspecific–cerebro-organic delayed effect syndrome is conceivable

Many of the men from the Edgewood experiments do suffer from these medical problems, as you can see from this enclosed attachment from the group

We have contact information on 24 former Edgewood Volunteers, five of whom are also Vietnam War Veterans. Of these: 8 are contact information only, 8 partially filled out a questionnaire, and 8 filled it out fully. The information herein therefore, comes from 16 men.

It must be made clear that Edgewood Volunteers we were not part of Whitecoat, Project 112, SHAD or Radiological experiments. However, the latter three are listed in VA “mandatory care” categories and Edgewood Veterans are not. The U.S Army Medical Research and Material Command informed us in 2007 that there were 7,839 Volunteers between 1951 to 1979. We were part of the formal experimentation years at Edgewood 1955-1975.

In 2003 the IOM stated that in 2000 they had contacted 4,022 Edgewood survivors. It is safe to suggest that there are less than 4,000 of us surviving today. The nagging question is; how many died of causes related to experimentation and how many living are disabled as a result of their Edgewood service? Col/Dr. James Ketchum wrote a book about Edgewood wherein he stated that there were no significant injuries amongst the volunteers and the DOD 2006 letter to Edgewood Veterans in stark contrast to the 1994 GAO report by stating that there were no significant long term effects.

The breakdown of Volunteer numbers of those known to us and the years they served at Edgewood are as follows: 1958: 313, 382, 781. [This is a sequential oddity because all served in the same month]

1965: 3738.

1966: 4088, 4095.

1968: 5247.

1969: 5619.

1970: 5984.

1972: 6145, 6566.

1973: 6640, 6692. [This is another sequential oddity, see 1969]

1974: 6778

The 16 answered as follows:

Military Records received: 6

Military Medical records received: 5

Medical Care promises received at Edgewood: 7

Edgewood Files received: 12

Volunteer Handbook received: 1 [1968 edition, none of the others ever saw one]

Signed Participation Agreement: 12

Signed Security Non-Disclosures: 5 [others received warnings and/or threats regarding disclosure]

Aware of Psychochemicals Projects before volunteering -0-

Aware of CIA participation at Edgewood: -0-

Medals promises received at Edgewood: 7

Received a letter of commendation: 11

Received a certificate of outstanding performance: 7

Contacted for the 1980 Army LSD study: 2

Contacted by the NAS for the 1980’s NRC studies: 7

Contacted by IOM for the 2000’s NAS study: 5

Contacted by the VA for its 2006 outreach: 11

Received the DoD enclosure in VA letter: 5

Listed on the DOD Edgewood registry: 4

Awarded Social Security Disability: 6

Awarded VA disability compensation: 1 @ 60%, 1 @ 80%, 6 @ 100%.

We see that 8 of sixteen men have Service Connected Disabilities, six of them Total and Permanent, and six of 16 are also Totally Disabled for Social Security purposes.

Seven of the 16 men reported partial or more PTSD disability compensation. The following may help us better understand this statistic.

1985 NAS/NRC long-term studies on volunteers Appendix C: [That the Army did not supply the names of all those exposed to drugs is evident]: “An issue of great concern was the relatively small group of men exposed to psychochemicals and their effects on interpretability. Briefly stated, it was felt at the outset by the panel reviewing psychochemicals that data obtainable from a survey might add little to our understanding of the long-term health effects of chemicals tested.”

The VA 2006 pg. 23, “Potential Health Effects Among Veterans Involved in Military Chemical Warfare Agent Experiments …” “Some of these exposures had the potential to cause substantial harm to the veterans health …” “ … long-term psychological effects could have resulted from just participating in these experiments.” DOD 2006 Fact Sheet: “Although the current medical literature indicates that such exposure may have some long lasting effects among some individuals, such as flashbacks [visual hallucinations] without new drug exposures.”

Finally, the 2007 Annals of Psychiatry state: “Interestingly, PTSD rates among veterans who participated in voluntary Chemical Warfare Agent research under controlled conditions, and were never expsoed to hostile enemy fire, were found to be higher than PTSD rates for veterans who participated in actual combat, in which the physical wounds inflicted were far more severe” “… the psychological trauma of Chemical Warfare Agents exposure is tantamount to the most intense and traumatizing types of stress found anywhere in human experience.”

We can now better understand why 8 men have Service Connected disabilities that include 7 with PTSD and their overall disabilities led to total Social Security disabilty for 6 of them.

To save the Army the cost of hazard pay they set the stage in 1958. The Chemical Warfare Laboratories published SP 2-13 wherein they stated that: “ … your participation in the various testing programs will be profitable to you and the U.S. Army” “… experimental procedures involving NON-hazardous exposure to compounds …” “ … volunteers are not allowed hazardous duty pay.” It is odd that they stated there were no hazards becausel, The volunteer’s participation agreements stated “I am completely aware of all hazards.” Additionaly, letters of commendation to Edgewood volunteers stated: ”… you deliberately made a commitment to undergo procedures whose outcome could not be fully known in advance” “….you not only displayed courage and maturity … .” The Army knew there were cosiderable hazards when they published AR 70-25 in 1962: “Volunteers as Subjects of Research”. “The experiment must be such as to contribute significantly to approved research …” “… unusual and potentially hazardous conditions are those that may be reasonably expected to involve risk, beyond the normal call of duty, of privation, discomfort, distress, pain, damage to health, bodily harm, physical injury, or death.” By 1975 all the latter had come to pass therfore, we could almost consider this AR to be an after action report.

The DoD certainly knew there were hazards. Defense Instruction 5030.29 1964: “DOD assumes full responsibility for humans involved in research under its sponsorship, whether this involves investigational drugs or other hazards.” In light of the Feres Doctrine their assumption of responsibility was meaningless and only intended to conform with the Helsinki Accords. “Edgewood Arsenal personnel knew well that experimentation was hazardous. In 1961 they published CDRL 2-44 wherein they lauded volunteers as ”Peacetime Heroes” “ … they serve far beyond the call of normal peacetime duty in a cause that vitally affects the nation’s defense posture.” They subjected themselves to risk in hazardous service and is reflected in the words on their commedndations: “above and beyond the call of duty.”

LTC Elfert served at Edgewood in 1958 and he suggested that the volunteers service was similarily stressful to combat. The DOD currently has a program entitled Combat Related Special Compensation for its Military retirees which is not limited to direct combat. Qualifiers include: While engaged in hazardous service, such as an experimental stress study [psychochemicals intended to cause maximum stress] and Instrumentality of War: Injury or sickness caused by gasses [mustard which is a carcinogen, CN a cyanide which causes heart damage, and DM an arsenic, all of which were tested at Edgewood along with 250 other chemicals].

The U.S. Army HRC Awards Branch in 2005 admitted to CIA MKULTRA participation at Edgewood when they answeried a volunteers query: “ … testing in the Edgewood Arsenal MKULTRA Program.” CIA MORI Documents clearly prove that the CIA funded Army experiments for over twenty years and that MKULTRA sub-project-45 in psychochemicals and K fields, known simply as the K agent program at Edgewood, was conducted using manufacturers reject drugs known to have bad side effects, and those were supplied by the CIA to Edgewood specifically for testing on Armed Forces volunteers.

That the Army and the DOD did not want to know about health cause and effect relationships, as they pertained to Edgewood volunteers, was made obvious by their actions and inactions.

In 1970-1971 the Army conducted a long term Follow-up Study of Medical Volunteers who received drugs at Edgewood. II Method. “It was decided to limit the study to volunteers who were serving on active duty. The study was limited to 40 men and conducted over a ten month period. “No subject felt that he had experienced physical or psychological changes as a result of participation in the program.” The army was likely pleased to know that its career soldiers suffered no ill effects. This gives rise to the question of what would have happened to the career soldier who admitted having residual mental issues?

The 1985 National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council final report pg. 50: “It appears that the subjects actually given psychochemicals in those experiments were selected from an optimal pool of mentally and physically healthy persons.” The 2006 DoD Fact sheet: “As a group, the volunteers selected to participate in the studies were above average in physical and mental qualifications when compared to other service personnel.” The DOD Fact Sheet sent to Volunteers informs them that the NAS/NRC stated: “The study did not detect any significant long-term health effects in Edgewood Arsenal Volunteers.” The NAS/NRC study final report actually stated: “However, the limited information available from follow-up on these soldiers does not permit definitive conclusions regarding the nature and extent of possible long-term problems resulting from chemical exposure at Edgewood.”

The 1975 Army Inspector General report stated Edgewood informed them that as of 1966 there were no volunteer deaths. The 1994 Government Accountability Office Report stated that there were some deaths and that “adverse health problems were not discovered until many years later --- often 20-30 years and longer.” VA Veterans Health Initiative 2003: “… ultimatley to compensation for a few families of subjects who had died during the experiments.” 1993 DOD {Human Experimentation}: “ … the DOD will, to the extent feasible, make available to the Department of Veterans Affairs information that may be useful in assessing disability claims of veterans. Edgewood veterans arriving at the doors of a VA prior to 2006 received little more than a denial of such a programs existence [Edgewood human volunteer experiments]. The NAS Institute of Medicine [IOM] conducted a study for the DOD beginning in 2000. In 2007 the Director wrote: The IOM committee was not charged with examining past exposures to specific chemicals, like those at Aberdeen/Edgewood, and assessing whether they caused disabilities in military personnel” “… where veterans were exposed to agents in classified experiments, the veterans were at a disadvantage, because it was difficult to get access to secret information needed to adjudicate their claims

Seven men remembered being promised medals at Edgewood. If the reader sees things as the DOD and the Army, then the rational for denying an Edgewood veteran medals earned the hard way is obvious because a medal for an Edgewood volunteer a road to culpability and an admission that their service was hazardous, that they were brave, courageous, and some valorious in their perilous Edgewood journey. Psychiatrists agree that it is rare for two individuals to have the same reactions to drugs and stressors or for them to have the same degree of suffering. Few had exactly the same agents and doses at the same time therefore, they were all set apart from their fellows making them eligible for individual awards.

U.S. Army HRC Awards Branch 2005: “ … volunteer service at the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Center, Edgewood, MD, is noteworthy, but he is not eligible for consideration of an individual award since the purpose and intent of the Army’s Awards Program is to recognize soldiers who actively engage in acts of heroism, meritorious achievement or meritorious service. Accordingly, these four recommendations cannot be considerd for review by the Army Decorations Board.

The DOD has stated that there were no significant long term effects leaving us to ponder the word significant, because the self evident truths herein can only lead a prudent man to conclude that the DOD and the Army cannot defend against, what they term allegations, because the issues of injuries that led to disabilities of half a sample presented herein are not reasonably debatable. Edgewood service was hazardous which caused death and injuries. A grateful nation needs to recognize these facts and properly reward those who gave of themselves in the name of National Security.

, kbeaudoin@mofo.com, webco99@hotmail.com, gene@capoferri.com, pfcarone@optonline.net, ddufrane@nycap.rr.com, jearnshaw@neo.rr.com, gerspamer@mofo.com, milton.farris@gmail.com, FaronYoung2@netscape.com, dongedeon@aol.com, pines489@yahoo.com, hytien@msn.com, pateacher@hotmail.com, allus231@msn.com, firehawk_28@yahoo.com, rmauro7846@yahoo.com, vbmay06@westriv.com, lamei2006@aol.com, roy@workplans.com, majordave84@yahoo.com, may551@hotmail.com, jratkinson@hotmail.com, purdiemae@yahoo.com, fmokar@embarqmail.com, tomsegel@sbcglobal.net


emuth@sbcglobal.net

The names above are among the people interested in the Edgewood veterans, spouses, veterans and advocates.

Some of these men have been waiting since the late 50s when they were used in the experiments, they felt they were going to finally get the promised medals/awards they were promised more than 50 years ago, the medical care and in the case of disabled veterans and widows, when the DOD and VA started contacting the veterans about the experiments in 2006,compensation and DIC payments, instead, we get put on the VARO hamster wheel where we are told our evidence is "internet garbage", incomplete and very narrow scoped medical follow up reports by the IOM due to parameters written by the DOD.

The veterans of the Cold war experiments, Edgewood Arsenal, SHAD/112, Fort Detricks Operation White Coat, Dugway Proving Grounds, Deseret cCenter Utah, chemical weapons experiments at the Cold Weather training Area Fort Greely Alaska, and any other unknown or admitted areas of experiments on human test subjects.

Many of us accept the fact that we will never know all of the susbtances we may have been exposed to, due to double blind experiments, I am not sure even the scientists know at this point, who was given what, nor when other than the window of the temporary duty assignment.

Myself I was there from June 25 1974 thru 22 August 1974 and my number is 6778A or 6778C depending on which paperwork the Army decides to locate, I have seen both.

Is there anything the GAO can do to help these veterans and their widows and families, since DOD, the VA and the IOM and NAS seem to be having problems helping us.

Michael G Bailey

1113 Swannanoa Drive

West Columbia, SC 29170

803-739-5749



CC Rick Erdtman NAS

J Nelligan GAO

Scott.Payne@mail.house.gov Congressman John Halls Office

sharon.schultze@mail.house.gov Congressman Filner's Office

Jack Alderson, Commander, US Navy Retired Operation SHAD/112

other SHAD and Edgewood veterans

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transition assistance program .com

http://tinyurl.com/4qbpu5

or
http://www.transitionassistanceprogram.com/portal/transition/resources/PDF/Compensation_and_Benefits_Handbook.pdf

The Department of Defense (DoD) has developed a comprehensive handbook describing compensation and other benefits service members and their families would be entitled to upon separation or retirement as a result of serious injury or illness.
The Compensation and Benefits handbook was compiled in cooperation with the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Labor, Health and Human Services and Education and the Social Security Administration. Additionally, there are references to assistance provided by other governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations

The handbook describes the disability eligibility process, various program qualifications, application procedures, and numerous resources with associated contact information. Additionally, there are references to assistance provided by other governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations.

Web sites and toll-free numbers are provided, and the electronic version includes hyperlinks. The electronic version of the handbook will be updated frequently and the hard copy of the compensation and benefits handbook will be updated annually.

The electronic version of the handbook can be found on the five Web sites listed below:

http://turbotap.org
https://www.nko.navy.mil
http://www.npc.navy.mil
https://www.aw2.army.mil
https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-af/USAF/AFP40/d/1073755231/Files/C&BHandbook

__._,_.___

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Military Health Care News

Military Health Care News

On Oct. 1, 2008, TRICARE Management Activity awarded contracts to the six designated providers of the Uniformed Services Family Health Plan (USFHP).
The USFHP is a Department of Defense (DoD)-sponsored health plan, made available by nonprofit healthcare providers in six service areas across the country. Over the years, DoD has partnered with these former U.S. Public Health Service facilities to provide care for military beneficiaries. Initially, they were given a statutory deemed status as military healthcare facilities. In 1997, Congress mandated that they become a permanent part of the Military Health System, to administer a program that became known as the US Family Health Plan.

USFHP offers the TRICARE Prime benefit to over 100,000 military beneficiaries, including active-duty family members, activated Guard and Reserve family members, and retirees and their family members. More than 40 percent of the USFHP participants are 65 and older.

The six not-for-profit healthcare organizations awarded these five-year contracts are:

Saint Vincent Catholic Medical Centers, New York, N.Y.;
Brighton Marine Health Center, Boston, Mass.;
CHRISTUS Health Systems, Houston, Texas;
Johns Hopkins Medical Services Corporation, Baltimore, Md.;
Martin’s Point Health Care, Portland, Maine; and
Pacific Medical Centers, Seattle, Wash.
One of the hallmarks of the USFHP is its ability to maintain a consistently high level of patient satisfaction. In 2008, overall satisfaction with the health plan was 87.9 percent, as compared to 61.9 percent for traditional HMOs. Contributing to this high level of satisfaction is a wide array of disease and care management programs, designed to keep members healthy and provide individualized care. Members are provided a comprehensive range of benefits, from preventative and wellness programs to intensive case management for members with chronic or multiple health conditions.

The 1997 National Defense Authorization Act directed DoD to include designated providers (DPs) in the health care delivery system of the uniformed services using sole source contracts. On Oct. 2, 2009, TRICARE Management Activity announced that TRICARE now provides primary caregivers of active duty service members (ADSMs) a respite benefit due to section 1633 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
This respite benefit gives caregivers who help homebound ADSMs needing frequent help a break from their responsibilities.

It is important to know that “homebound” members are service members whose conditions or injuries make them unable to leave home without taxing effort. “Frequent” means that service members need more than two interventions during the eight-hour period per day that the primary caregiver normally would be sleeping.

To provide the best possible help and respite for caregivers, this benefit will provide a maximum of eight hours of respite per day, five days per week.

ADSMs, or their legal representatives, can submit receipts for reimbursement of respite care services that were provided after Jan. 1, 2008, by a TRICARE-authorized Home Health Agency.

For more information about this benefit visit the TRICARE Web site at http://www.tricare.mil

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