new book from the National Academies of Science

Improving the Presumptive Disability Decision-Making Process for Veterans

The book is long but there is one chapter that caught my attention is is Chapter Eleven Governmental Classification and Secrecy

Secrecy surrounds many facets of homeland security issues and, in general, is of concern to national security. Many scientific studies conducted during the two world wars through the Cold War were classified, and many are still not declassified. Studies dealing with warfare gases and radiation were classified during the time of the studies and remain classified today. This classification makes appropriately informed treatment of the involved veterans with adverse health effects difficult, if not impossible, and impedes research on the consequences of exposures. The recent declassification of mustard gas and lewisite studies conducted during World War II and numerous radiation studies documented that classification greatly deterred treatment of health effects affecting the volunteers who played key roles during these studies. To many citizens, the idea of secrecy in government is linked with “national security secrets” or “classified information.” The system of classification occupies a special place in governmental secrecy. Classified information is accessible only to those who have been “cleared” following investigation and who agree to abide by the rules regarding access to this information; violation of these rules can result in severe criminal penalties. These rules can greatly hinder medical treatment of individuals who have been exposed during classified activities.

The section of the book is long, but as one of the 7120 veterans used at Edgewood Arsenal from 1955 thru 1975, I am in the limbo of not being able to get access to the information that I and the other survivng veterans need to get our current medical problems service connected that may have been caused by environemtal toxic exposures either from the drunking water, surface water or soil in the training areas.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has these toxins listed on their web site which the veterans Administration refuses to accept (they call the documents internet trash) List of toxic substances on Edgewood Arsenal

Groundwater 1,1,1,2-TETRACHLOROETHANE VOC
Soil 1,1,2,2-TETRABROMOETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1,2,2-TETRACHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1,2-TRICHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,1-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,1-DICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater 1,2,4-TRICHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater 1,2-DICHLOROBENZENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,2-DICHLOROETHANE VOC
Groundwater 1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water 1,2-TRANS-DICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater 1,4-DICHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Soil 2-HEXANONE VOC
Sediment 2-METHYLNAPHTHALENE PAH
Sediment 4,4-DDE Pesticides
Sediment, Soil 4,4-DDT Pesticides
Groundwater ACETONE VOC
Groundwater ALUMINUM (FUME OR DUST) Metals
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water ANTIMONY Metals
Soil AROCLOR 1248 PCBs
Soil AROCLOR 1254 PCBs
Soil AROCLOR 1260 PCBs
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water ARSENIC Metals
Groundwater, Soil BARIUM Metals
Groundwater BENZENE VOC
Soil BENZO(B)FLUORANTHENE PAH
Groundwater BENZOIC ACID Base Neutral Acids
Soil BENZO[A]ANTHRACENE PAH
Sediment, Soil BENZO[A]PYRENE PAH
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil BERYLLIUM Metals
Groundwater BORON OXIDE Inorganics
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water CADMIUM Metals
Groundwater CALCIUM Metals
Soil CALCIUM CARBONATE Inorganics
Groundwater CARBON DISULFIDE VOC
Groundwater CARBON TETRACHLORIDE VOC
Sediment CHLORDANE Pesticides
Groundwater CHLOROBENZENE VOC
Groundwater CHLOROFORM VOC
Groundwater, Soil CHROMIUM Metals
Groundwater CIS-1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater COBALT AND COMPOUNDS Inorganics
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water COPPER Metals
Groundwater CYANIDE Inorganics
Soil DIBENZO(A,H)ANTHRACENE PAH
Groundwater ETHYLBENZENE VOC
Soil HEPTACHLOR Pesticides
Soil HEPTACHLOR EPOXIDE Pesticides
Soil HEXACHLOROBENZENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater HEXACHLOROBUTADIENE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater, Soil HEXACHLOROETHANE VOC
Soil INDENO(1,2,3-CD)PYRENE PAH
Solid Waste INORGANICS Inorganics
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water IRON Metals
Groundwater, Sediment, Soil, Surface Water LEAD Metals
Soil LEWISITE Base Neutral Acids
Groundwater, Sediment MAGNESIUM Metals
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water MANGANESE Metals
Groundwater, Soil MERCURY Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water METHYLENE CHLORIDE VOC
Soil MUSTARD GAS Organics
Groundwater NICKEL Metals
Groundwater NITRATE Inorganics
Solid Waste NOT PROVIDED Not Provided
Soil OIL & GREASE Oil & Grease
Soil, Solid Waste PCBs PCBs
Sediment PHENANTHRENE PAH
Soil PHOSGENE Pesticides
Soil PHOSPHORUS (YELLOW OR WHITE) Inorganics
Groundwater POTASSIUM Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water SELENIUM Metals
Groundwater, Soil SILVER Metals
Groundwater SODIUM Metals
Groundwater TETRACHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater TETRACHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater, Soil THALLIUM Metals
Groundwater TOLUENE VOC
Groundwater TRANS-1,2-DICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater TRICHLOROETHENE VOC
Groundwater, Surface Water TRICHLOROETHYLENE VOC
Groundwater VANADIUM (FUME OR DUST) Metals
Groundwater, Surface Water VINYL CHLORIDE VOC
Solid Waste VOC VOC
Groundwater XYLENES VOC
Groundwater, Soil, Surface Water ZINC Metals


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DISCLAIMER: Be advised that the data contained in these profiles are intended solely for informational purposes use by employees of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for management of the Superfund program. They are not intended for use in calculating Cost Recovery Statutes of Limitations and cannot be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party in litigation with the United States. EPA reserves the right to change these data at any time without public notice.

Hardly internet trash

pages 300 & 301
The use of chemical warfare agents and simulants in the 1960s is a further example of retaining human studies under the umbrella of secret classification. In a series of tests under the project list of SHAD, Navy ships were exposed to chemical or biological agents or simulants to establish protective measures and decontamination efficiency for machinery and personnel (SOURCE: http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/shad/index.jsp; http://www1.va.gov/shad/; Brown, 2003). The numerous tests were classified as secret and have only been recently partially declassified, again at the insistence of an IOM study (IOM, 1993). In this example, the Department of Defense (DoD) allowed IOM and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) personnel who possessed sufficient security clearance levels to review the documents and release selected pieces of information. It must be noted, however, that not all of the classified SHAD data have been declassified; only those parts that identify personnel involved, for which records were kept by DoD, and the agents or simulants they were potentially or actually exposed to have been declassified. These examples then bring to the forefront: How many other human use studies have been, or are being, conducted and are classified secret? In an August 2006 information letter released by the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) (VHA, 2006, p. 2), more than 250 chemicals were identified as chemicals of potential concern related to human use studies.

page 302
SECRECY AND MEDICAL RESEARCH
Numerous aspects of medical research have been classified on the basis of national security and have only recently been brought to public light. The ACHRE Report (ACHRE, 1995) enumerated numerous radiation studies conducted during and after World War II which were classified, and some still have not been declassified. Although the Espionage Act of 1918 really began the era of national security classification, more and more documents have been classified with each new Presidential administration (ACHRE, 1995; Quist, 2002). Today the system is complicated and burdensome to use as discussed above. Medical research is still conducted and classified under the aegis of national security. This secrecy classification can establish hindrances in the medical care provided to the participants in these studies. All institutions that participate in medical research have some degree of classification for their projects, depending upon funding sponsor, subject, and agents used. Much of the current research on modern nerve agents, for example, is classified at the secret and above levels, even though there are many unclassified documents on nerve agents available to the public (IOM, 1993). And while DoD participates extensively in classified medical research studies, VA has not been excluded from such activities. Chapter 13 of the ACHRE Report outlined VA participation in maintenance of “confidential” files regarding radiation studies:

VA, similarly, was able to provide fragments of information that show that “confidential” files were kept in anticipation of potential radiation liability claims. However, neither the VA, nor the DOE and DoD (who evidently were parties to this secret record keeping), have been able to determine exactly what secret records were kept and what rules governed their collection and availability. (ACHRE, 1995, ch. 13)

(As explained in Chapter 10 of the ACHRE Report, VA concluded that a “confidential” division contemplated in relation to secret record keeping was not activated.)

So this book highlights the fact that the VA NEVER created the the division that could access these classified records to obtain the information the affected veterans needed to process their compensation claims, so what happened to the claims, they were denied for a lack of eveidence.

Page 3030
Medical research involving human subjects must follow certain ethical and standard practice guidelines such as those established by the Nuremberg Code of 1947 (Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, 1949). The 10 key elements of the Nuremberg Code are outlined in Appendix L-3. Some medical research studies conducted prior to the Nuremburg Code implementation might not have followed the precepts of the code. Congressional inquiries during 1975 and 1976 requested that the Army Inspector General review the use of human volunteers in chemical agent research (IOM, 1993). An excerpted summary of this review (Taylor and Johnson, 1975) is presented in Appendix L-4. While this report concentrated on psychochemical testing conducted during the period 1950-1975, it also addressed the history of chemical warfare testing using human volunteers and the degree of compliance with the Nuremberg Code (IOM, 1993). The overriding conclusion from this report was that the secrecy applied to research using human volunteers “left ample room for misinterpretation, lack of knowledge about [guidelines governing human volunteers] and outright disregard for established policies and guidelines” (Taylor and Johnson, 1975, as referenced in IOM, 1993, p. 379). Concern regarding these conclusions remains today.

page 304
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM IOM’S VETERANS AT RISK REPORT

In Veterans at Risk (IOM, 1993), emphasis was placed on (1) the lack of exposure data, (2) the continuing dependence and reliance on secrecy by DoD, (3) serious ethical questions regarding the use of human volunteers, (4) total absence of long-term medical surveillance of participants, and (5) in some cases inadequate short-term follow-up even though medical knowledge was available as early as 1933 that exposure to mustard gas or lewisite could produce adverse health problems.

The oath of secrecy taken by participants, and enforced by potential punishment protocols if broken, resulted in continual and escalating cases of health impairment among the human volunteers in these chemical agent studies. The Taylor and Johnson report contains specific statements addressing the issue of secrecy and the participants who took the secrecy oath. An overarching conclusion stated in the report addressed future DoD research with human subjects. These future studies must be conducted following a set of ethical principles that mirror those that non-DoD researchers must follow. The 1975 Army Inspector General report (Taylor and Johnson, 1975) concludes that the mantle of secrecy gives implicit permission to researchers to stretch the boundaries of ethical guidelines in DoD human research under the guise of national security.
VA acknowledges that it must, at times, request exposure data from DoD in order to make a compensation decision. These exposure data may or may not be classified by DoD, and DoD has the option of releasing the data to VA. If the data are classified, DoD may not release them to VA citing national security issues (as stated during Do, 2006, and Freeman, 2006). This failure to release exposure data hinders medical treatment to the veteran. The potential for negative impact on the veteran population is demonstrated in the August 2006 VHA information letter released to health-care providers and the public (VHA, 2006). In this letter, VHA indicated that there may be in excess of 250 additional chemical agents that were used or tested in the chemical warfare arena. The Committee does not know if there are data available on each of these chemicals or if the data are unclassified. DoD is the only organization that can provide those answers. DoD has acknowledged that some 250 additional chemicals might fall under this concern (VHA, 2006). If chemical studies have been classified, DoD is not obligated to inform VA about the studies under the umbrella of national security concerns. As discussed above in the levels of classification, there are many levels under which exposure data could be classified. And, if DoD were to impose the restriction on VA that they must identify which data and under which level of classification the data fall before they release the data to VA, this would hinder access to important information useful for the care of veterans. Not withstanding national security issues, VA must have access to all exposure data to fully provide health care to veterans. A high level of cooperation between both agencies is necessary to provide maximum support to the veteran population.

SUMMARY
In view of the history of human subject use in various DoD and other agency studies, a mechanism is needed to protect the health of our veterans and their families. A joint effort between DoD and VA must be initiated to develop a mechanism to monitor human studies and provide health-protection measures to those individuals involved. Foremost would be the identification of all Service members involved in the studies. Secondly, the chemical, biological, infectious, and radiological agents used during the studies must be identified so that potential adverse health effects and treatments can be determined. Thirdly, accurate exposure assessment data must be collected and made available to appropriate scientists to be used in determining treatment regimens. As is the case in issues of this concern, the “dose makes the poison.” Fourthly, national security concerns must be maintained while providing the necessary health support to veterans and their families.

These areas of concern should be addressed by the formation of, and effective and intelligent use of, a joint DoD-VA board to develop and implement policy areas surrounding national security and human subject research. Paramount to the effectiveness of the board, would be membership of individuals with sufficient security clearance to address national security, DoD weapons and tactical areas, and medical concerns, including exposure assessment. The major undertakings of this board would be the following:

Identifying any human-use study

Developing a registry of Service members involved in the studies

Developing a tracking mechanism to maintain contact with the Service members involved in the studies

Providing periodic medical evaluations or surveillance of Service members involved in the studies

Determining appropriate medical treatment if an adverse health effect is detected

Developing a mechanism to make information public as necessary

Keeping the veteran, and family as applicable, fully informed regarding potential health effects of the materials that were used in the studies

Recommendation
DoD and VA should establish and implement mechanisms to identify, monitor, track, and medically treat individuals involved in research and other activities that have been classified and are secret.

There are clearly times when national security or mission success depends on maintaining secrecy regarding certain aspects of a Service member’s military experience. However, every effort should be made to find mechanisms for characterizing Service member exposure and health histories in manners that do not interfere with the broader issues of national security or mission success. DoD should develop procedures that ensure full or partial declassification of sensitive information for the timely provision of that Service member’s or veteran’s health care. When such declassification is not possible, DoD should establish procedures whereby blinded data relevant to the Service member’s health and exposure history are provided.

In some instances where national security and secrecy issues cannot be resolved, DoD and VA may need to establish mechanisms involving experts with appropriate security clearances to monitor affected registry cohorts for potential health outcomes and define surveillance or research activities that may need to be conducted within appropriate secrecy clearances. An interagency agreement could be developed between DoD and VA addressing the secrecy issue. As both agencies have used the classification system in the past, this agreement would address the policy development process and the exchange of classified information between the two agencies. The process would include establishment of a joint DoD-VA board composed of individuals who have sufficient security clearance to discuss classified data. The access to the classified information process would be contained in a written document outlining a mechanism to identify, monitor, track, and medically treat individuals who were part of research activities involving human subjects and whose research design and results have been classified.

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Excuse me I am 53 years old and since I was 18 when I was used in theswe experiments in 1974, I am one of the youngest survivors, since the government has failed to do the right thing despite numerous promises since 1975, the Church Commission, the 1994 Rockefeller Commission, VA Sec Princippi's promise in 1991, then Sec of defense Dick Cheney's promise in 1991, and then Sec of the VA Princippi promising the Detroit Free Press in Nov 2004 that the VA would work with utmost speed to help these aging veterans, I think this new book by the NAS/IOM illustrates how much the government is dragging their feet on obtaining help for the disabled veterans that are related to Edgewood Arsenal, SHAD 112, Dugway Proving Grounds, Fort Detricks Operation White Coat, and any other classified programs the government has not come clean about, these veterans and their widows and other family members deserve assistance, if there is any possibility their medical problems could possibly be related to any exposures while in federal service, as it is known "The Promise"

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